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The purpose of this study was to develop an account of sport to assist sporting 
communities in improving the normative conditions of their sports. The examination 
begins with a look at the moral problems plaguing elite sport today. At the root of 
these is the instrumental reasoning used by athletes, coaches, owners and 
administrators to justify the use of sports as vehicles to fame and fortune and the 
failure of these community members to act on behalf of their sports as social practices. 
Three accounts of sport from the sport philosophy literature-formalism, 
conventionalism and anti-formalism-lack the normative strength to protect sports 
from corruption because they do not give community members guidance concerning 
which changes or actions will be beneficial or harmful to their sports. A fourth theory, 
broad intemalism, provides internal principles or criteria that offer such guidance, but 
does not give community members a deliberative space in which to discuss and debate 
the best interests and problems of their sport. 
As a theory that creates just such a space, Alasdair Maclntyre's theory of 
practical reasoning is a strong candidate to be fashioned into a more complete version 
of broad intemalism. This Aristotelian theory establishes the internal goods of social 
practices like sport as their ultimate ends or teloi. In sports, these goods are the skills, 
strategies and challenges set forth by the rules, the standards of excellence attained 
within a particular sport, and the significant traditions that make the sport a 
meaningful activity. A sport's internal goods thus form a foundation from which 
community members can deduce the virtues and actions that are best for that sport. 
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Finally, the nonnative strength of the Maclntyrean theory of sport is 
established through its application to two contemporary scenarios from elite golf and 
figure skating. In both of these cases, the deliberative space and nonnative guidance 
of the Maclntyrean approach offer assistance to community members in solving 
problems within their sport that formalism, conventionalism and anti-formalism 
cannot offer. In the final analysis, the theory requires sporting communities to be 
communities of inquiry, in which members act as vigilant caretakers who critically 
examine their own actions and the goods and virtues in which they are grounded to 
insure that they are reasoning in the best interests of their sports. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
As I sit down to write this introduction on the fifteenth day of September, 
2001, I find myself somewhat at a loss for words. The horrific events of four days 
ago, in which thousands perished in the bombings of the World Trade Centers in New 
York City (my hometown) and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. have left the people 
of the United States of America in pain and fearful of what lies ahead. As citizens of 
this country, it is a time to reflect on the true value of human life and human freedom, 
and the price many have paid for it. In the wake of the atrocities of September 11th, 
the topic and subject matter of this dissertation and of my Doctoral studies seem 
utterly trivial. As a man who has spent his days considering ethical matters within the 
world of sport, I find myself searching for the value of sport philosophy and any 
lessons it may have to offer during this time of fear and doubt. 
I begin this search by asking myself questions that I have often asked: Why 
have I chosen this topic? Why have I chosen to relate the value theory of philosopher 
Alasdair MacIntyre to the moral issues that plague sport at its elite level today? What 
possible value can be gleaned from this academic exercise? How can it improve the 
lives of those who participate, coach and organize sports in the United States and 
around the world? 
Facing this axiological inquisition, my first response is to run and hide. What, 
after all, could be so earth-shatteringly important about this theoretical piece I am 
writing? What could it possibly offer to my fellow Americans at this time of crisis in 
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our country? And then I remember that phrase; that phrase spoken by so many, so 
often in relation to sport: "The good of the game." This is a phrase of vague meaning 
used frequently by those within elite sport and many outside of it to convey the idea 
that sports are things that have interests that need to be recognized, assessed, and 
attended to. But what are these interests and how are they best looked after by those 
who govern and participate in elite sports? What do people mean when they say that 
their actions are "for the good of the game," or that the actions of others are "not in the 
best interests of the sport?" As I have considered "the good of the game" over the last 
few years, I have found it to be a phrase that is at best ambiguous, and, at worst, has 
little or nothing to do with the best interests of sports as unique, culturally meaningful 
activities. 
The phrase seems to be invoked most often by the members of two opposing 
groups. The first group is made up of the owners of professional sport franchises, the 
athletic directors and presidents of universities with elite football or basketball 
programs, and those who govern professional leagues, intercollegiate athletics and 
international sporting events. These individuals have a tendency to identify "the good 
of the game" with the economic good of the game, often basing their decisions on 
economic factors and, thus, endorsing changes that will improve the financial standing 
of leagues, governing bodies and those associated with them. When these individuals 
believe it is necessary to justify changes in the rules or regulations that govern a sport 
or alterations in the traditional league or playoff structures that have framed excellence 
within that sport over time, they often state that the impending adjustments are "for the 
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go�d of the game." Some do this to give their economically-based decisions more 
credibility with the fans of the sport; others truly believe the decisions that bring the 
most money to a sport are always in its best interests. Whatever their reasons, this 
group of individuals is primarily interested in sports as commodities, and is not 
necessarily concerned with the interests or goods of sports apart from their 
commercial value. 
This economic group is often countered by a group of journalists, idealists and 
knowledgeable fans who believe that many of the economically-driven changes that 
are made to the formal and traditional frameworks of sports go against "the good of 
the game." They contend that such changes only herald the further degradation of 
elite sports and the subjugation of these sports to the individual financial interests of 
those who govern and participate in them. When this group speaks of "the good of the 
game," they speak not of sport's financial standing, but of an almost mythical state of 
wellness that elite sports enjoyed during "the Golden Age"-an indeterminate period 
of time before the 1970' s when sports were allegedly played by athletes who respected 
their rules and traditions and money was not the only object of those who watched 
over them. 
While those with a strong understanding of sport history and of the socio­
cultural factors that have influenced sport recognize this second view as a 
romanticized one, we should be careful not to trivialize it, since it points to an idea 
that has yet to be sufficiently developed within the world of sport. What indeed is the 
"good" of the game? What are the elements of sports that make them unique and 
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culturally meaningful activities? Can the members of elite sporting communities 
identify these elements? And, if so, how can they either protect them from those 
economically-minded egoists who would ransom them for personal or institutional 
fame and fortune, or make changes to them that would enhance traditional forms of 
sport and preserve or reestablish their moral integrity? 
The failure of those who govern and participate in elite sport to address the 
above questions in any substantive manner has left the members of elite sporting 
communities without a rational and moral framework to guide their decision making. 
What directs their reasoning in its place are often their own individual economic 
interests or the financial interests of the team, university, league or governing body 
they represent. The focus in elite sport is thus on what one can get from a sport rather 
than on what one can give back to it. Many in American politics, business, education, 
law, media and other institutions are similarly focused on the personal and material 
goods they might gain from these practices rather than the contributions they might 
make to them and to those they serve. "What's in it for me?" is the first question that 
such individuals ask, not "What is best for my constituents, my customers, my 
students, my country or my planet?" 
In my opinion, it is time that individuals and groups begin to address questions 
of this second type, and elite sport is one area in which such a process of inquiry 
should be carried out. Although not one of the institutional pillars of American 
society, elite sports are highly valued by many in this country. Those who are 
successful within this realm are handsomely rewarded with fame and fortune. Now is 
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th� time for those who have reaped the benefits of their sport's popularity to consider 
ways in which to give back to that sport. It is time for athletes, coaches, owners and 
administrators to determine what the best interests of their sports are and how they can 
best achieve those interests. 
Sadly, those who govern and participate in elite sport seem to be at a loss as to 
how to carry out such a task. They seem incapable of coming together over the issues 
and questions that are of the greatest concern to their sports. Some are simply too 
selfish to take the time to address such issues. Others are unsure of how to bring 
opposing sides together to productively discuss and debate these issues as members of 
a single sporting community. It seems, then, that these individuals are in need of some 
kind of framework that will help them identify and emphasize the goods and interests 
of their sports and deliberate how best to protect these or how to modify them in ways 
that preserve the sport as a unique form of activity. 
It is my belief that, if adapted and applied to sport, Alasdair Maclntyre's theory 
of practical reasoning may provide us with just such a normative framework. The 
primary objectives of this dissertation were to develop an account of sport from 
Maclntyre's work, and to analyze its possible applications within the context of elite 
sport. This process begins in chapter one, where the moral integrity of elite sports is 
questioned through examples that demonstrate the popularization, commodification 
and commercialization of sport at this level. These socio-cultural factors have 
influenced many athletes, owners and organizers to view sport instrumentally, as a 
means to their own private ends. These individuals have come to see sports primarily 
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as avenues to fame and fortune rather than as activities that are valuable in themselves. 
Thus, they come to primarily accept a form of instrumental reasoning in relation to 
sport; a brand of reasoning in which sports are viewed as means to the end of winning 
and as providers of economic, political and social wants rather than as cultural 
activities with unique goods and interests, moral and otherwise, that need to be looked 
after. 
For the purposes of this examination, "elite sports'' include (a) professional 
sports as played in the National Football League (NFL), National Basketball 
Association (NBA), National Hockey League (NHL) and Major League Baseball 
(MLB); (b) men's intercollegiate football and basketball at the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association's (NCAA) Division I level; and (c) elite professional and amateur 
international athletic competitions, including the Olympic Games. The athletes, 
coaches, administrators and owners who participate in and govern sport constitute 
what I refer to as "sporting communities." The reader will note that I have focused 
this examination primarily upon elite sporting communities of men's sports. This 
should not be taken to mean that the Maclntyrean view of sport has nothing to offer 
women's sport. On the contrary, as I demonstrate in my discussion of the plight of 
figure skating's elite community in chapter four, the deliberative framework and moral 
and rational guidance that this view offers can assist women's sporting communities 
as much as men's. I have chosen to concentrate most of my efforts upon the current 
problems within men's athletics because it is there that instrumental reasoning is most 
prevalent and the assistance of the Maclntyrean view is most needed. 
After demonstrating the manner in which instrumental reasoning has come to 
dominate and corrupt elite sport in chapter one, I tum, in chapter, two to the 
philosophy of sport literature to see if any of the four main accounts of sport 
developed within it are normatively strong theories that could help the members of 
sporting communities in reestablishing and protecting the moral integrity and 
meaningfulness of their sports. The normative strength of a theory is measured in 
terms of its ability to provide communities with (a) a public space in which to discuss 
their sport and the issues and problems plaguing it, and (b) a framework to guide the 
reasoning of members in their efforts to improve their sport's moral condition and 
maintain its uniqueness. 
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The four accounts of sport normatively tested in chapter two are formalism, 
conventionalism, anti-formalism and broad intemalism. The first three of these 
theories all suffer from flaws that directly affect their normative strength. 
Formalism-the view that sports are primarily defined by their formal rules-invests 
too much in the rules of sport and, thus, cannot help community members to alter them 
in ways that will morally and rationally improve the sport. Both conventionalism­
the theory that asserts that the contexts and conventions of sports play an important 
role in defining them-and anti-formalism-the view that the unique actions of 
individual athletes are constantly redefining and recreating sports-fail to give the 
members of sporting communities any way to mediate between those actions that are 
good for their sports and those that are harmful. 
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�y broad intemalism-the view that there are internal principles or criteria 
that can provide community members with moral and rational guidance concerning the 
welfare of their sports-provides community members with a basic framework and 
some guidance regarding the best interests of their sports. The only normative 
weakness of this view is that no version of it has been developed that creates a 
deliberative space in which community members may dialogue about their sport's 
interests and problems. In chapter three, I present an account of sport fashioned from 
Alasdair MacIntyre' s theory of practical reasoning; a broad intemalist account that 
gives sport community members just such a deliberative space. Maclntyre's form of 
Aristotelian practical reasoning presents rationality as something that belongs to a 
person as a member of a practice. On this view, the rationality of practices like sports 
is determined by their internal goods. In the case of sports, these goods would include 
the skills, strategies and challenges set forth by the formal rules of the sport, the 
standards of excellence that have been attained within it, and the traditions that have 
come to add to the uniqueness and cultural meaningfulness of the sport. The virtues 
and actions that facilitate the achievement of these goods and standards are considered 
"morar' and "rational''; those that hinder their achievement are "unethical" or 
"irrational". In the Maclntyrean theory, unlike instrumental theories of reasoning, 
what is moral or rational is not a function of individual or institutional interests, but of 
the goods of the sport. 
Another important advantage that MacIntyre' s view has over the four accounts 
of sport examined here is that it provides the members of elite sporting communities 
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with a way to recognize and address the normative problems that have accrued within 
their sports. The theory requires community members to be prepared to reexamine the 
ultimate ends (te/oi) and internal goods of the practice, as well as its virtues, actions 
and reasoning, in light of challenges brought forth by dissenters within or outside of 
the community. It is through such challenges and their own examination of the sport's 
practical reasoning that these members are able to recognize existing flaws within it 
and, with guidance from the internal goods and virtues of the sport, make the 
alterations to the sport's rules, policies or conventions that will improve it morally and 
rationally as the special kind of activity it is. This ability to reexamine their reasoning 
regarding the sporting practice-a skill that MacIntyre refers to as independent 
practical reasoning-is thus another important element that can help sporting 
communities to police themselves and reduce or eliminate corruptive actions within 
their practice. 
All in all, the Maclntyrean account of sport presented in chapter three gives us 
a theory of sport that appears to be normatively stronger than its predecessors. But is 
it? In chapter four, I apply the Maclntyrean theory to two specific instances in 
contemporary elite sport to see if it can assist communities in devising solutions for 
the issues facing them. The first case is that of Casey Martin, a disabled golfer 
recently granted an exemption to the Professional Golfing Association (PGA) Tour's 
walking rule. The Supreme Court's decision to allow Martin, whose diseased right leg 
makes it dangerous for him to walk in tournaments, to ride a cart countered claims by 
PGA officials that walking was an "integral part" of PGA golf. The second example 
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comes from the context of international figure skating, where the fairness and honesty 
of judging and the adequacy of the current scoring system are in question after 
"Skategate"-the judging scandal that made headlines during the 2002 Winter 
Olympic Games, in which bloc judging and vote trading appeared to have affected the 
initial outcome of the pairs competition. The effects of political practices and of 
cultural and personal bias upon the scoring and ranking of skaters have been known 
for some time, and have brought the moral integrity of figure skating and even its 
standing as a sport into question within the international sporting community. 
The Maclntyrean theory proves to be useful in helping community members in 
working out their various issues because it provides them with the opportunity to 
discuss and debate the ultimate ends and shared internal goods of their sports and the 
virtues that make it possible to achieve them. From such discussions, the decisions 
that will improve their sports as unique moral and social practices are clarified. In the 
Casey Martin case, I contend that the te/os and internal goods of golf are related to the 
primary activity of shot-making. Martin's cart riding gives him no unfair advantage 
over walking professionals in shot-making. Hence, no harm would befall the sport if 
he was granted an exemption to the walking rule. On the contrary, the officials and 
playing professionals of the PGA would be granting Martin access to the internal 
goods of his sport at its highest level and giving him the opportunity to vie for the 
prize money and status available to the best players at that level. 
In the case of figure skating, the Maclntyrean approach can help community 
members to settle the question of what the te/os and internal goods of the sport should 
11 
be_. In examining the two sides of this issue, it becomes evident that the telos of figure 
skating should be a balance between athleticism and artistry, and its internal goods 
should be those associated with the athletic and aesthetic movements that make 
skating a unique form of competitive activity. From this conclusion, I contend that 
community members would, based on the virtues of honesty, fairness and compassion, 
reason that it would be in the best interests of the sport to eliminate political games 
and the judging of skaters on reputation or appearance from the sport. I also argue that 
members would move to limit or minimize the influence of judges' cultural and 
personal preferences on the scoring and ranking of skaters based on the virtue of 
fairness and the good of artistic freedom. 
At the end of my analysis of each case, I briefly demonstrate how the solutions 
offered by the Maclntyrean approach to sport compare to those that formalist 
conventionalist and anti-formalist accounts might offer. The nonnative weaknesses of 
these theories are clearly displayed in this process. Formalism privileges the rules of 
sport above other elements and, hence, is unable to help us in deciding when rule 
exemptions are in order or what kinds of rule changes would improve a sport. 
Conventionalism protects the conventions of the sport from criticism. 
Conventionalists would, without just cause, overtly favor walking in golf and the 
acceptance of subjective judging criteria like cultural and personal preferences and the 
appearance of skaters as "part of the sport," and, thus, would not help us when the 
value of these elements of golf and figure skating are questioned. Finally, the anti­
formalist account of sport fails in both cases to give us any way to figure out what 
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types of individual actions should be accepted within golf and figure skating 
respectively, and, therefore, gives us no way to stop corruptive actions from becoming 
part of these sports. 
On the basis of the above evidence, I conclude that the Maclntyrean account of 
sport is the strongest nonnative theory examined here. It is the only one that gives the 
members of sport practice communities a space in which to deliberate about the 
ultimate ends, internal goods and virtues of their sports, and establishes these as guides 
from which members can deduce which actions are in the best interests of their sport 
and which are not. The Maclntyrean theory is also the only one that requires 
communities to act as communities of inquiry, in which members are vigilant in 
watching over their sports and in critically examining their reasoning and the goods 
and virtues of the sport in light of either sound challenges brought forth by outside 
dissenters or of problems and issues recognized by community members themselves. 
The theory as a whole emphasizes the responsibilities of community members as 
caretakers of their sports to understand what the best interests of those sports are and 
to protect those interests from the corruptive practices of individuals. It is in carrying 
out these responsibilities that athletes, coaches, owners and administrators come to 
know and value "the good of the game," and it is in acting together as a reflective 
community for that good that they can begin to bring moral integrity and meaning 
back to sport at the elite level. 
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Chapter II 
Instrumental Rationality and the World of Elite Sport 
Elite sport enters the Twenty-first Century cloaked in corporate logos and 
dollar signs. Organizers and owners, athletes and agents, networks and sponsors all 
emphasize the economic aspects of sport as they collaborate in the generation of once 
unfathomable riches. The language of sport has become that of business as profits and 
salaries have merged with stories and statistics in the media. One particular medium, 
television, is largely responsible for the sound economic health of elite sport today. 
Television coverage has increased the popularity of a variety of professional and 
intercollegiate sports and international sporting events, transforming them from 
sporting ventures into athletic dramas and larger-than-life entertainment spectacles. 
The following chapter is an examination of the effects of popularization, 
commercialization and commodification on elite sport organization and participation. 
Its purpose is to demonstrate how these effects are indicative of the instrumental 
reasoning that dominates contemporary sport and society. It is this form of reasoning 
owners, administrators, coaches and athletes use to pursue wealth, power and prestige 
through sport by emphasizing winning and financial gain over the moral integrity and 
internal values of sport competition. 
The Commercialization and Commodification of Elite Sport 
The mutually beneficial relationship between sport, the media and the 
economy facilitates the commercialization and commodification of elite sport today. 
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As televis_ion coverage has increased sport's popularity, corporations have competed 
with one another for the privilege of associating their names and products with 
leagues, universities, teams and athletes. The increased demand for advertising time 
has led to increases in both the advertising fees networks charge their sponsors and the 
broadcast rights fees that professional leagues and franchises, amateur governing 
bodies and universities charge the networks. 
Astronomical increases in the prices of broadcast rights fees are particularly 
noteworthy. The price for the American rights to the Summer Olympic Games has 
risen from 225 million dollars in 1984 to 894 million dollars for the 2008 Beijing 
Games (Senn 16). In 2001 ,  the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) paid the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 545 million dollars for the rights to 
its Men's Basketball Tournament-an increase of approximately sixty percent over 
the 2 1 5. 6 million stipulated in the previous contract (Martzke 3C). And four different 
networks paid the National Football League {NFL) a total of 2.2 billion dollars per 
year to broadcast its games in 200 1 (Martzke 3C}-an increase of over 1 .  8 million 
dollars over the 378 million the league received in 1986 (Coakley 378). 
As an abundance of television exposure has popularized sport, those in charge 
have harvested more than broadcast fees. Owners of professional franchises have 
tapped a variety of revenue sources in an effort to capitalize on the increased acclaim 
of their sports. In 1996, gate, merchandising, media and stadium revenues 1 added up 
to total revenues averaging 77. 7 million dollars for NFL teams, 66 million dollars for 
1 Stadium revenues include the money teams receive from concessions, stadium advertising 
and naming rights, parking, luxury box leases and other stadium-related profits. 
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Major League Baseball (MLB) teams, and 57.4 million dollars for National Basketball 
Association (NBA) teams (Coakley 346). Increased popularity has also helped owners 
convince local governments and taxpayers to build new entertainment "sportplexes" 
for their teams. As team identities have taken root and fan bases have experienced 
exponential growth, owners have found it easier to cajole or, if necessary, blackmail 
taxpayers into allocating funds that might be better spent on education or other public 
concerns to the construction or renovation of stadiums or arenas (Coakley 346-4 7). 
Universities with elite football and/or basketball programs have also benefited 
from increased television exposure. These schools have not only received revenues 
from conference television contracts, but have collected gate, stadium and 
merchandising revenues in a manner similar to professional organizations. Strong 
programs have traditionally received the most national television exposure, which has 
allowed them to maintain their strength by signing the best available high school 
recruits. These perennial winners have also received money for their appearances and 
performances in football bowl games and the NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament. 
Over the years, bowl and tournament payouts have increased so significantly that a 
key loss can cost a university millions of dollars. In 1 996, for example, The 
University of Notre Dame missed an extra point and an Alliance Bowl bid worth eight 
million dollars in the season's final game against the University of Southern California 
(Zimbalist 3). 
Universities, owners and organizers are not the only ones who have exploited 
the commercial success of sport. Professional athletes have also benefited 
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handsomely from the growth of the sports industry. The salaries of NFL, NBA, NHL 
(National Hockey League) and MLB players have increased dramatically in 
conjunction with revenues and media exposure over the last 50 years. Lavoie 
calculated that the average MLB player made over 1 . 1  million dollars in 1996---fifteen 
times more than the 77 thousand inflation-adjusted dollars their counterparts collected 
during the 1950s. In that same year, the average NHL player's salary (760 thousand 
dollars) was seventeen times greater than that of the average 1950s player ( 45 
thousand inflation-adjusted dollars) (qtd. in Coakley 354). 
In addition to their high salaries, some professional athletes have received 
endorsement moneys from corporations wishing to associate their names and products 
or services with the athlete. Superstars like golfer Tiger Woods and NBA player 
Michael Jordan have received lucrative endorsement deals from a variety of 
companies that have supplemented and, at times, surpassed their earnings from 
playing their sports. Although deals of this stature are not the norm, endorsement 
opportunities are available to prominent professional athletes whom sponsors believe 
can boost the appeal and sales of their products or services. 
Although intercollegiate football and basketball players have not received 
salaries or money from bowl or tournament payouts or endorsements, they have 
garnered the increased recognition that accompanies school success. As mentioned 
previously, winning programs are televised more often than weaker ones. Athletes 
who have taken advantage of this extra exposure with strong individual performances 
have improved their odds of playing at the professional level. Others already 
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ea�arked for professional stardom, like fonner Virginia Tech quarterback Michael 
Vick and former Duke University forward Shane Battier, have increased their value in 
the NFL or NBA drafts and secured larger salaries and more lucrative endorsement 
deals through excellent performance. 
The above examples demonstrate the many ways in which athletes, 
universities, organizers and owners have profited from the abundant acclaim sport has 
derived as television entertainment. These groups, however, have further assisted in 
the commodification and commercialization of sports by modifying them for mass 
consumption. Elite sports rely upon spectator appeal for commercial success. In order 
to facilitate the achievement of such success, sporting communities have altered rules 
to improve sports as media productions and commodities and maximize spectator 
interest. These rule changes have been instituted to speed up games, balance 
competition, and maximize action, scoring and excitement (Coakley 334-35). The 
NBA provides us with a recent example of this process. The league implemented new 
rules designed to increase scoring for its 1 999-2000 season, with the hope of regaining 
or replacing some of the fans lost during the 1998 player lockout. 
Rules are not the only features organizers have modified in search of 
commercial appeal. Over the years, both professional leagues and the NCAA have 
altered playoff and tournament formats in order to include more teams and increase 
both the number of games played and, most importantly, post-season revenues. The 
NCAA has increased the number of football bowl games and the number of teams 
involved in its Men's and Women's Basketball Tournaments in the last twenty years, 
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while the NFL, NBA, NHL and MLB have all consistently added series and games to 
their playoff agendas over the last three decades. 
Catering to the masses by restructuring playoff formats and revising rules can 
be economically beneficial for elite sport organizers and participants. In many cases, 
however, there is a Faustian price to be paid for commercial success of great 
magnitude. Athletes, owners and administrators who become mesmerized by the great 
wealth and power available to them through sport may participate in morally 
questionable practices or allow such practices to continue for their own gain. Players 
may resort to cheating or even violence in order to gain advantage over opponents and 
improve their chances of winning. Coaches may condone or authorize such actions or 
violate league or conference regulations for the same reason. And owners and 
administrators may make allowances for many such behaviors because they, like the 
players and coaches, believe that these trespasses are part of "business as usual" and 
may even increase the appeal of sports by making them more exciting and intriguing 
to the common fan. A brief examination of noteworthy cases from professional, 
intercollegiate and international sport illustrates that morally questionable practices are 
prominent yet dubious features of elite sports today. 
Our first morally questionable practice can be found in the National Hockey 
League, where players, owners and the commissioner's office continue to accept 
fighting as a part of NJil, hockey. Why do these groups condone such violence when a 
few simple rule changes could eliminate it from the sport? Some players contend that 
fighting is a safety valve that allows them to release frustrations face-to-face so they 
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will not lose control and "cheap shot" one another with cross checks or stick slashes. I 
will not speak to the validity of this argument within the context ofNHL hockey. I 
will only point out that I have watched many Olympic hockey tournaments in which 
fighting is forbidden and have seen no players physically scarred from having to 
control their tempers. NHL owners and league officials have thus far chosen to ignore 
examples such as this and to parrot the argument of their players. Why? Because 
fighting and violent acts have mass appeal; they attract more fans who are primarily 
interested in hockey as a form of entertainment and allow owners and organizers to 
capture a higher percentage of television ratings and available entertainment dollars. 
Thus we see how the lure of commercial success can help to maintain morally 
questionable practices within a given sport. 
Professional hockey, however, is not the only sport context that harbors such 
practices. Athletic and economic success are so highly valued within men's NCAA 
Division I football and basketball that athletes, coaches and athletic directors are often 
enticed to break rules and regulations designed to ensure fair competition and quality 
educational experiences for student-athletes. According to its 1997-98 Manual, the 
basic purpose of the National Collegiate Athletic Association is 
[t]o maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the 
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student 
body and, by doing so, retain a clear line of demarcation between 
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports ( qtd. in Zimbalist 3 ). 
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As Zimbalist points out, however, the "watchdogs" of this governing body 
have done little more than increase the size of their manual over years. They have 
consistently failed to enforce many of the regulations in this tome, and those they have 
chosen to enforce have seldom deterred those bent on breaking the rules (Zimbalist, 
4-5). For instance, NCAA rules makers and investigators have often looked the other 
way as universities have flouted eligibility rules and coaches have increased the time 
requirements they place on their athletes. 
The increase in athletic requirements is of grave concern to those who believe 
that universities are failing to emphasize academics in men's Division I football and 
basketball programs. Such critics fear that as student-athletes spend more and more 
time training, lifting weights and analyzing game films, they will devote less and less 
time to their studies. In Backbaords and Blackboards: College Athletes and Role 
Engulfment. Adler and Adler note that athletes, coaches and athletic directors often 
treat academics as secondary. if not marginal, endeavors at this level. Their nine-year 
study demonstrates a lack of balance between athletics and academics in high-profile 
men's basketball programs and concludes that it is the structure of these programs that 
is largely responsible for the lack of academic emphasis. 
Finally, Olympic athletes and organizers have so immersed themselves in the 
quest for wealth, status and success that they have brought the very integrity of the 
Games into question. Although the percentage of athletes that have added illegal 
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pe� ormance-enhancing drugs and techniques to their training routines is unclear, 2 the 
general increase in usage of these substances gives us an indication of what Olympic 
nations, coaches and athletes are willing to do to gain advantage over or keep pace 
with the opposition. Due to scientific advances, performance-enhancing technologies 
like steroids, creatine, human growth hormones, amphetamines and blood doping are 
more accessible to elite athletes than ever before. Many of these, however, have been 
declared illegal by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and/or the 
international governing bodies of sports because they may be harmful to athletes and 
may give those who use them an unfair advantage over those who do not. The issues 
and arguments of doping in international sport are far too numerous and complex to 
examine here. 3 Suffice to say that, until we have a better understanding of how these 
technologies affect health and the balance of competition, athletes' use of them in 
international competition will remain both physically and morally questionable. 
Is the commercial success of the Olympic Games responsible for the increased 
use of performance-enhancing techniques? Coakley contends that we should not 
blame the media or the popularity sport has attained through television for the 
increased usage of these technologies, since athletes were using many of these before 
the advent of television ( 168). However, he does believe that the increased popularity 
and media exposure have led the IOC to turn a blind eye toward some athletes' 
2 For more on this topic, see Charles E. Yesalis, Andrea N. Kopstein and Michael S. Bahrke, 
"Difficulties in Estimating the Prevalence of Drug Use Among Athletes," Doping in Elite Sport, eds. 
Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2001)  43-62. 
3 For more on the issues concerning perfonnance-enhancing drugs, see Wilson and Drese, 
Do.ping in Elite Sport. 
22 
transgressions. He cites Jennings, who contends that during the 1984 Los Angeles 
Summer Games, organizers ignored the positive drug tests of several competitors to 
protect the image of the Olympic Movement; an image already tainted by the 1984 
boycotts of the U.S.S.R. and many Eastern Bloc countries and the United States' 
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Games ( qtd. in Coakley 172). 
Incidents such as this one have led many to question the credibility of an IOC­
led World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). At the IOC's World Conference on 
Doping in Sport in February, 1999, General Barry Mccaffery, Director of the U.S. 
Office of National Drug Control, led a failed campaign to make WADA an 
independent testing agency. McCaffery and others believed that, in light of the 1998-
99 Salt Lake bid scandal, it would be a conflict of interest for the IOC to lead an 
agency whose findings could further diminish the image, appeal and immense 
commercial value of the Olympic Games (Patrick 3C). 
The Salt Lake scandal itself is a vivid example of how the recent mega­
commercializ.ation of the Olympic Games has led organizers to act in morally 
questionable ways in pursuit of power wealth and status. Investigations by the internal 
ethics committees of the IOC and the Salt Lake Organizing Committee (SLOC), the 
United States Olympic Committee (USOC), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and the United States Congress revealed how Salt Lake Bid Committee 
members attempted to influence the votes of IOC members with over a million dollars 
in gifts, scholarships, trips and other assistance. As a result of these investigations, six 
IOC members were expelled, four resigned, and many others were officially 
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reprimanded ("A Time of Turmoil" lOC). The remaining members of the IOC voted 
to eliminate future full membership visits to bid cities in December, 1999 (Dodd 1 C). 
This, however, does nothing to guarantee that bid committees will cease their attempts 
to sway the votes of IOC site selection committee members, or that these IOC 
members will remain vigilant and uninfluenced in the face of future bribes. 
To sum up my argument, the generous exposure elite sport has received 
through television has increased its popularity manifold. As a result, sports have 
developed into entertainment and economic juggernauts, to which owners, organizers, 
institutions and athletes are beholden. To aid in the further commodification and 
commercialization of sport, these individuals and organizations have modified their 
particular sports to make them more appealing to mass audiences, and have allowed 
morally questionable practices to become established within them. 
Having said this, the question that now arises is "so what?" Why should we be 
concerned that elite sports are being marketed to a mass audience or that controversial 
practices have become enmeshed within these sports as individuals have pursued fame 
and fortune through them? In the following section, I will discuss why the above facts 
should concern all of us, especially those interested in reestablishing the integrity of 
elite sports and protecting them from potentially corruptive forces. 
Instrumental Rationality and the Problems of Elite Sport 
The moral apathy and commercial kowtowing that permeate elite sports are 
heralds of a far more insidious phenomenon. The aforementioned stances are usually 
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justified b_y win- or profit-at-all-costs arguments that members of sporting 
communities offer in defense of their actions and decisions. Such arguments rely on a 
specific mode of reasoning that places the interests of a particular individual or 
organization ahead of the "best interests of the sport"-the challenges, traditions and 
standards that make a sport the particular type of activity it is. 4 I will refer to this 
manner of thought as instrumental reasoning because those who reason in this way use 
the practices they are involved in as means toward the gratification of their own 
personal ends rather than attempting to further the ends of the practices themselves. 
Examples of instrumental reasoning in American society are abundant. 
Businesses often attempt to embellish claims about their products or to sell 
substandard or potentially harmful products to consumers who believe they are buying 
reputable goods. University presidents and boards of trustees continue to increase 
admissions ( and tuition revenues), ignoring the impact that larger class size has upon 
the quality of a student's education. Politicians make policy decisions that benefit 
them financially or augment their reelection campaigns rather than those that help 
their constituencies. And, as previously demonstrated, owners, administrators, 
universities and athletes modify and manipulate the rules and traditions of elite sports 
and allow morally questionable practices to become part of their sports in order to 
capitalize on their value as commodities. 
Since it is the challenges, standards and traditions of sports that make them 
4 
For the purpose of this work, I am accepting Aristotle's claims that the good of a thing has to 
do with its function, and that its function is essentially what it does that makes it the particular type of 
thing it is. 
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unique and meaningful, one might ask if questionable actions simply change sports 
into different kinds of activities. This, in fact, is not the case. When athletes, coaches, 
owners and administrators violate the rules or regulations of a sport in order to gain a 
competitive advantage, they are, to varying degrees, purposely altering the challenges 
that define sport contests. By doing this, these community members are doing more 
than changing the type of activity in which they are involved; they are abandoning the 
agreed-upon challenges of the sport that have been established through its rules and 
their interpretation, and placing their opponents at the horns of a dilemma. The 
opponents must choose whether (a) to honor the fonnal and traditional challenges of 
the sport and allow the violators to gain an unfair advantage, or (b) to take part in 
equivalent or similar rule breaking behaviors that will put them on equal footing with 
the original violators but will forsake the sport's challenges. Furthennore, rule 
violators alter challenges without thought of whether the changes they are making will 
have negative consequences for the sport. Thus, I contend that those who use 
questionable actions do more than change sports as activities; they change sports 
without consideration of the negative effects of their actions and without any dialogue 
about whether the historically-established, agreed-upon challenges of the sport should 
be altered. 
Many elite sport organizers and participants would object to the claim that they 
act selfishly and without regard for their sport. Commissioner Bud Selig and owners 
of Major League Baseball franchises, for example, would balk at the accusation that 
recent changes to the sport's league and playoff structures were instituted primarily for 
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their own .benefit and not for the good of baseball. They might contend that the 
realignment of the American and National Leagues and the addition of another round 
of playoff series not only aided in the game's economic recovery from the 1994 labor 
strike, but helped increase fan interest by recasting Major League Baseball in a more 
exciting form. On the basis of evidence that the above changes brought more fans, 
media attention and, yes, money to the sport, MLB owners and organizers might well 
conclude that they neither ignored the best interests of the game of baseball nor used 
the sport as an instrwnent for their own individual or group purposes. 
The above argument, however, still implies that baseball is predominantly an 
economic entity; a media-driven product to be consumed by the masses for its 
entertainment value. While a certain level of economic success is required to sustain 
the sport, a lust for greater profits can lead its community members to covet wealth in 
place of the goods, values, standards and traditions of the sport. Furthermore, if we 
accept that baseball's primary value is commercial and economic in nature, we must 
also accept that the actions and decisions that increase the commercial or economic 
value of Major League Baseball will be in its own best interests. This means that if 
league or playoff restructuring increases revenues throughout the league, we should, 
according to this argument, view the restructuring as a positive process carried out for 
"the good of the game" rather than an attempt by owners to increase their teams' 
profits. 
Unfortunately, what the owners, organizers and players of Major League 
Baseball tend to forget is that its value extends beyond its abilities to entertain crowds 
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and produce revenue. Baseball, like other sports, is a social practice, a mosaic of the 
actions facilitated by its rules and the customs and traditions nurtured by its 
practitioners. These internal elements play an important role in making baseball the 
type of game that it is. The formal rules allow for the display of certain skills like 
hitting and pitching and for the occurrence of certain events like home runs and 
strikeouts. These rules establish the challenges of baseball that teams must overcome 
to win and the ways in which individuals can meet the sport's standards of excellence; 
they give meaning to these successes within the sport. Baseball' s traditions have 
grown up intertwined with these rules, sometimes challenging their formal framework 
( as when pitchers scuff or "load up" baseballs with foreign substances to gain 
advantages over hitters), other times enhancing it ( as when umpires help second 
basemen and shortstops to avoid injury by allowing them to put runners out on double 
plays by "phantom tagging" second base rather than touching it). 
The skills, events and traditions that make up the game of baseball are 
cherished by many of its players and more knowledgeable fans. These individuals 
believe that these internal aspects of the sport are its most valuable assets, and, hence, 
that the owners and organizers of Major League Baseball must account for these when 
making commercial and economic decisions that would alter them in any significant 
fashion. The owners and Commissioner of Major League Baseball might well contend 
that they are aware of the importance of the rules and traditions of the sport, and that 
they work to protect them any time they are considering making changes to the sport. 
They might point out, for example, that they have preserved the unique skills and 
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events that are part of the sport by avoiding extensive rule changes over the years. 
While this may be so, a critic could certainly argue that the owners and commissioner 
have significantly altered the traditional structure of Major League Baseball by 
realigning its leagues and modifying its playoff structure. Alterations of this kind, I 
would argue, have considerably changed the meaning and inherent value of winning 
the regular season championships of the American and National Leagues and the 
appreciation that people have of those accomplishments. 
Some historical background is necessary if we are to fully understand the 
effects of these changes. Until 1969, neither the American nor the National League 
was split into divisions. At the conclusion of each season, the first place teams from 
both leagues met in the World Series, which has remained a best-of-seven series since 
the early 1920' s. In 1969, each league was split into two divisions whose winners met 
in a best-of-five League Championship Series for the right to go to the World Series. 
These Championship Series became best-of-seven series in 1985. Finally, in 1995, 
Divisional Championship Series were added to the format. In this new round of 
playoffs, the winners from each league's newly-realigned three divisions and the "wild 
card team''-the best remaining team from each league-are matched up to play best­
of-five series within their leagues. The winners of these Divisional Series earn the 
right to face one another in their league's best-of-seven Championship Series for the 
honor of playing in the World Series. 
As new rounds of playoffs have been added, the meaning of regular season 
games has been altered. Whereas these games used to determine which two teams 
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would meet in the World Series, now they determine which four teams from each 
league will vie for that honor. Baseball fans, writers, organizers, owners and players 
disagree about which format is better. Some believe the enhanced playoff format is an 
improvement over the old system because it gives more successful teams, who have 
worked hard over 162 games, opportunities to win their league's championship. 
Others question whether these teams have earned such opportunities, since they could 
not catch the best teams by the end of a long season. 
In cases such as this, however, we must consider more than which format is 
better. As we have just seen, each format has its own merits and values. Given these, 
it is important to ask what are sound reasons for replacing a traditionally-valued 
playoff format that is "part of the sport" and has helped to set the standards of 
excellence within it? As Major League Baseball and other professional sports have 
become more and more commercialized, people have begun to readily accept 
economic reasons as sufficient justifications for reconfiguring leagues and playoff 
structures and changing the rules of sports. I contend, however, that to do so without 
accounting for these sports' internal values and traditions is to fail to recognize their 
integral aspects and to short-change those individuals who value them. 
All this is not to imply that traditions should be shielded from criticism 
because they are naturally superior to proposed improvements. On the contrary, these 
traditions should be critically evaluated to ensure they are good for the sport. 
However, the responsibility should also lie with those proposing changes to show that 
their modifications do more than line the pocketbooks of community members within 
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the sport. _They must demonstrate that their changes would improve the sport as the 
special type of activity that it is-as a competitive venture involving physical skills 
and strategies that outline a particular form of athletic excellence to which members of 
sporting communities commit themselves. The standards of excellence of the sport 
have been set within these boundaries. Hence, members of sporting communities have 
the responsibility to explain proposed changes to their sport in relation to its 
challenges, standards and traditions, and are accountable to them insofar as they are 
the best elements that the community has developed to date. 
The above example demonstrates the negative consequences that instrumental 
reasoning can have for sporting communities. If the members of these communities 
are primarily concerned with their own individual interests, they may forsake the 
traditions, conventions and rules of their sport without any thought for those who 
value them or for the sport as social practice. For the organizers and players of Major 
League Baseball and other professional sports, this has meant discarding traditional 
league alignments and playoff configurations that had played meaningful roles in 
setting the standards of excellence for the sport, and adopting new ones in hopes of 
improving league and personal economic status. The problem with instrumental 
reasoning in this case is not that it allows the leaders of sporting communities to 
replace traditional playoff formats with new ones. The problem is that it allows them 
to do so without recognizing their responsibilities to their sports as social practices and 
to their fellow community members who valued the post-season frameworks that 
traditionally determined how league champions would be crowned. Thus we see how, 
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�der the guise of economic responsibility, powerful groups and individuals within 
sport are able to consistently ignore chosen internal values and traditions in their 
efforts to improve institutional and personal economic, social and political status. 
Just as participants and organizers can use instrumental reasoning to justify any 
changes they make to sports, they can use it to justify the morally questionable 
practices they accept as part of sports. These individuals often claim (implicitly if not 
explicitly) that winning and profit-making are the ultimate ends of sports and, as such, 
validate practices from fighting in professional hockey, to fudging grades for 
intercollegiate athletes, to taking illegal performance-enhancing drugs in international 
competition. Even the Salt Lake Bid Committee members used instrumental 
reasoning to excuse their attempts to bribe IOC members. They believed the wealth, 
status and power Salt Lake City would attain from hosting the Olympic Games 
justified their actions, and that they had done nothing wrong because they were just 
doing what they had seen other cities do to win their bids ("Blame on Welch Unfair" 
5C). 
The above also exemplifies how instrumental reasoning has adversely affected 
the manner in which elite organizers, teams and athletes view competition. To many 
at this level, competition is merely a means to the ultimate end of winning. These 
individuals demonstrate this attitude toward competition through both their words and 
their actions. Athletes and their coaches, for example, often refer to opponents as 
"enemies" to be "conquered" or "obstacles" to be "overcome". Athletes may also be 
taught to use illegal tactics (e.g. , discretely holding an opponent's jersey in football or 
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basketbaH) and, in some cases, violence against opponents to improve their team's 
odds of winning. From the above observations, it is clear that opponents are not being 
spoken of or treated as valuable human beings who are helping their opponents test 
their mettle, but, rather, as mere "things", "others" or "impediments" that lie in the 
road to fame and fortune. 
In some contexts, winning has been so strongly emphasized and competition 
and the good opponent have been so devalued that coaches and athletes would rather 
handily defeat an inferior opponent than risk losing to a stronger one that would better 
test their skills in the sport. Recently, a trend of scheduling weaker opponents has 
developed in NCAA Division I intercollegiate football. Stronger programs look at the 
resulting contests as opportunities to pad their records and improve their odds of 
landing bids to prestigious bowl games. This practice of instrumental scheduling has 
become so commonplace that the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) had to include 
strength of schedule as a factor within its ranking system to account for it. Now, other 
things being equal, teams with stronger schedules are ranked ahead of those with 
weaker schedules in the race for the National Championship. Even with this 
adjustment, however, most successful programs are still scheduling some inferior 
teams, depriving both players and fans of more challenging and exciting contests. 
To sum up, the instrumental rationality that pervades elite sport is problematic 
because it is used by the members of sport communities to justify a variety of morally 
questionable stances and practices that have become accepted within them. 
Individuals and organizations utilize instrumental reasoning to emphasize their own 
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interests through win- or profit- at-all-costs arguments that justify the morally 
questionable decisions and actions that benefit them. In doing this, these individuals 
are conveniently able to hide the fact that they are ignoring responsibilities they have, 
as members of a sport community, to the traditions and internal values of that sport 
and the people who value them. Finally, coaches and athletes can use instrumental 
reasoning in an effort to demonize or devalue opponents or to present the process of 
sport competition solely as a means to the ends of winning and profit-making. 
Instrumental reasoning has become so much a part of sports at the elite level 
that those involved with them readily accept it as the principal way to reason within 
these contexts. There are, however, other ways of thinking about sports that may have 
greater normative value for these organizers and participants. The chapter that follows 
demonstrates the importance of values and principles that are internal factors of elite 
sports as socially constructed practices. The significance of these is established 
through an examination of four accounts of sport. As each of these accounts 
highlights different aspects of elite sports, a more complex and complete picture of 




Normative Value and Accounts of Sports 
What features and values make sports the kinds of activities they are? Do 
these features and values simply disclose to us how sports operate, or do they also give 
us revealing glimpses into their potentiality that show us what they can be at their 
best? Do they merely describe the various economic, political and social factors 
influencing the functioning of institutionalized sports? Or can they also lend 
normative guidance to the members of sporting communities as they determine how to 
best structure and play their sports? 
Over the last 30 years, the philosophy of sport literature has produced four 
distinctive accounts of sport that offer answers to the above questions: Formalism, 
which contends that sports are defined and characterized exclusively by their formal 
rules; conventionalism, which argues that sports are social constructions that are 
primarily defined by their social and historical contexts and conventions; anti­
formalism, which portrays sports as ever-changing, pliable activities that are 
constantly being redefined and remade through the unique actions of individual 
athletes; and broad interna/ism, 1 which asserts that sports contain socially grounded, 
internal principles that can assist practice communities in determining which actions, 
values and decisions are in the best interests of their sports. 
In the following chapter, I examine these four accounts of sport to 
1 "Broad Intemalism" is the term coined by Robert L. Simon to describe theories of this kind. 
See his article "Intemalism and Internal Values in Sport," Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 27 (2000): 
6- 1 5  for a thorough description of this account of sport. 
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ascertain the normative value of each for the members of sporting communities. I 
contend that the strongest normative accounts are those offering members a normative 
framework that permits them to deliberate about the best interests of their sport and 
gives them guidance in the determination of those interests. More precisely, this 
framework (a) provides the members of a sporting community a "space" within which 
to discuss and debate issues concerning the welfare of their sport; (b) guides these 
members in determining what the best interests of their sport are and which values, 
actions and decisions best facilitate their achievement; ( c) assists members in 
recognizing sound challenges to the status quo that often reveal potential threats to or 
problems within their sport and community; and ( d) guides them through the process 
of altering the rules, conventions and policies of their sport in a manner that preserves 
or re-establishes its moral integrity while maintaining or reemphasizing the facets of 
the sport that make it the unique activity that it is. 
I present the above framework not as the single indicator of normative 
strength, but as an essential feature of it, without which any theory of sport would be 
ill-equipped to assist members in the process of protecting their sport and community 
from corruptive influences. As my examination demonstrates, any theory that does 
not allow the members of a sporting community to substantially weigh the positive 
and negative consequences of particular rules, traditions or policies, or does not guide 
them in how to weigh these different factors in relation to one another, cannot help 
them patrol the normative borders of their sport. In other words, such a theory does 
not help them to recognize the difference between actions, values and decisions that 
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are good �or their sport and those that may be harmful to it. For this reason, I 
conclude that any account of sport that does not provide the members of a sporting 
community with a sound normative framework as described above lacks the normative 
strength to assist them in protecting the best interests of their sports. Having 
established the importance of a strong normative framework, I now proceed with my 
investigation to determine if any of the aforementioned theories of sport can provide 
such a framework to sporting communities. 
Formalism and Conventionalism 
According to Simon, formalism is "a family of positions that characterize 
games and game derivative notions primarily in terms of their formal structures 
(Intemalism 2). He contends that we can look at this family of viewpoints from either 
a broad or narrow perspective. From a broader perspective, formalism is the view that 
sports are primarily defined by their constitutive rules-the rules that set out the skills 
and strategies that may and may not be used within the game-and the obstacles or 
challenges these rules establish for the participants. The constitutive rules of soccer, 
for example, define it as a sport in which players are challenged to control and 
advance the ball and score with only their feet, legs, torso and head. These rules also 
forbid the use of hands by players other than goalkeepers to create this specific 
challenge for players and, thus, make soccer the unique kind of activity it is; the kind 
in which players forsake a more accurate and efficient way of moving the ball (i.e., 
using hands and arms to throw it) in favor of less accurate and efficient ways of 
moving it (e.g. , kicking or heading it) (Suits, Grasshop_per 37-38). 
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In a narrower sense, formalism is the view that "game derivative notions" such 
as "winning a game" and "a move or play within a game" can be defined only in 
relation to the constitutive rule of the game (Simon, Intemalism 2). Morgan presents 
this perspective clearly in stating that 
what it means to engage in a game, to count as a legitimate instance of 
a game, to qualify as a bona fide action of a game, and to win a game is 
to act in accordance with the appropriate rules of the game. All 
instances that fall outside the rules of the game, therefore, do not count 
as legitimate instance or actions of a game (Logical Incompatibility 
1 ). 
Thus formalists believe that it is our knowledge of the rules of soccer that tells 
us whether participants are playing a game of soccer or another type of game (e.g., 
kickball), and whether a player is executing a pass or taking a shot in soccer. This 
knowledge also tells us if the team we are rooting for is the winner of the soccer match 
when it has ended. Hence we see that unless we are at least minimally acquainted 
with the rules that govern soccer or other sports, we would not be able to understand 
what the athletes are doing, why they are doing it, whether they are doing it fairly and 
whether they have won or lost. 
The formalist position is often represented in the literature by the logical 
incompatibility thesis, which asserts that those who intentionally violate the defining 
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constitutive rules of a sport fail to compete in that sport and, therefore, are precluded 
from winning. According to this thesis, if a soccer forward was to purposely pick up 
the ball and throw it to a teammate every time she received a pass, players on both 
teams would recognize that she was not executing a pass in the manner stated by the 
rules of soccer and, hence, was not playing soccer. Her disruptive style of play would 
prompt her coach to substitute her out so that the two teams could resume their game 
of soccer and her team would be recognized as the winner should they have scored the 
most goals by game's end. 
The above instance clearly displays how those who consistently and 
irrationally violate the constitutive rules of a sport fail to compete at that sport. But 
what if our forward was more discrete about her rule breaking? What if she played by 
the rules most of the time, but attempted to deflect the ball into the goal with her hand 
whenever she believed that opponents and officials would not notice? Would the 
other participants still say she was failing to play the game? Or would they instead 
contend that she was playing the game, but doing so unfairly? 
This second scenario can be used to draw out the normative implications that 
arise from the acceptance of the logical incompatibility thesis. Theorists like Pearson 
and Fraleigh contend that the formal rules of a sport are an implicit if not explicit 
agreement between participants about how their sport is to be played. 2 Applying this 
understanding of formal rules to our second example, formalists might argue that, by 
2 See Kathleen M. Pearson, "Deception, Sportsmanship, and Ethics" and Warren Fraleigh, 
"Why the Good Foul Is Not Good," PhiloSQPhic Inquiry in Sport, eds. William J. Morgan and Klaus V. 
Meier, 2nd ed. (Champaign, Il..: Human Kinetics, 1995) 183-87. 
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breaking the rules, our deceitful forward has broken the agreement between teams and 
is therefore not playing the sport of soccer. 
More strict versions of formalism, such as the one endorsed by Pearson, suffer 
from a fatal flaw: They fail to recognize the difference between the two types of rule 
breaking presented above. In the first scenario, our irrational passer fails to compete 
in the sport of soccer because she consistently fails to receive and make passes in 
accordance with the constitutive rules of soccer. In the second scenario, our deceitful 
forward attempts to gain unfair advantage over her opponents and elude penalty by 
punching the ball into the goal when she believes she will not be caught. Strict 
formalists contend that, in both instances, the forwards are breaking the formal rules of 
the sport and, thus, are failing to play the sport of soccer. More moderate formalist 
theories, such as the one set out by Morgan (Logical Incompatibility 2-4 ), recognize 
that whereas the irrational passer of our first scenario is violating a constitutive rule 
stating that she cannot pick up the ball and throw it to her teammates, the deceitful 
forward of our second scenario is violating a regulative rule-a rule that proscribes an 
action (i.e. ,  using her hands) and ascribes a penalty to the player who uses them. 
This distinction between constitutive and regulative rules allows moderate 
formalists to explain the differences between these two types of violations in a way 
that strict formalists cannot. As Lehman points out, strict formalists have no way to 
distinguish failing to compete from competing unfairly (283). They see the violations 
of the deceitful forward and the irrational passer both as failures to compete in the 
sport of soccer. Moderate formalists, however, can use the constitutive/regulative rule 
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distinctio� to distinguish between unfair play and a failure to participate in a sport. 
Thus, they can argue that (a) the irrational passer fails to compete in the sport of 
soccer because she consistently violates the constitutive rules of soccer, and (b) the 
deceitful forward is competing in the sport of soccer but is doing so unfairly when she 
chooses to violate the regulative rule prohibiting the use of hands in scoring. The 
capacity to distinguish between different types of rule violations and, in turn, the 
difference between unfair competition and the failure to compete give moderate 
formalism an advantage over strict formalism as a potentially strong normative 
account of sport. 
Because they honor and respect the constitutive rules of sports and the 
challenges they present to athletes, moderate formalists may use these primary 
elements of sport to assess the regulative rules and policies established to protect 
them. By referring to the constitutive rules and the fundamental skills and strategies 
that they believe define the sport, they can determine when the penalties associated 
with such rules are too weak to dissuade athletes from violating them. Moderate 
formalists thus may recognize, for instance, that the penalties accompanying fighting 
in NHL hockey and those accompanying fouling to regain possession late in NBA and 
NCAA basketball games are too weak to stop athletes from resorting to such tactics 
when they believe it to be necessary. 
While moderate formalism may be able to help us regulate sports to some 
extent, the theory, as Hardman has noted, is incapable of helping community members 
assess possible changes to the constitutive rules of their sport. When such changes are 
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proposed, moderate formalists have only the rules in question to refer to; hence, unless 
they would be willing to move beyond the constitutive rules of the sport, moderate 
formalists would find no reasons to change these rules and would maintain them ad 
infinitum ( qtd. in Simon, lnternalism 4 ). 
The sport of cricket provides us with an interesting example of how a sport can 
radically change its constitutive rules over time and still be considered essentially the 
same sport by its practitioners and caretakers. Roberts' portrayal of the history of 
cricket displays how the skill of bowling, which was once executed with an underarm 
throw, has evolved to the point that it is now executed with an overarm throw ("It's 
Just Not Cricket" 71 -75). While this evolution took place in many stages over a 200-
year period, it could not have occurred without the eventual changes in constitutive 
rules that accompanied the acceptance of previously illegal, or at least unconventional, 
types of bowling. These changes, in turn, could not have been made unless the sport's 
caretakers and practitioners were willing to look beyond the constitutive rules stating 
what a proper bowl was to find reasons for altering the skill. If the members of the 
cricketing community had only had the sport's constitutive rules from which to work, 
they would have chosen to maintain those rules and bowling would have remained an 
underarm skill to this day. 
Moderate formalists might object that I have limited their resources too 
severely in the above example. They could claim that they do have something beyond 
a sport's constitutive rules that they can refer to when assessing possible changes to 
them. These are the challenges and obstacles that make a sport the particular type of 
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activity that it is. Although these are also established by the constitutive rules, 
principles could be developed from them that would help the members of sporting 
communities determine if a particular change to the constitutive rules of their sport 
would be in its best interests. 
Although this objection is not without merit (in fact, it forms the foundation 
upon which we find the broad intemalists standing later in this chapter), Simon has 
argued ( and I agree) that the moderate formalists are extending their theory beyond 
the constitutive rules of sports here (Intemalism 6-7). They are referring to principles 
that can only be developed through a substantive dialogue about the internal goods and 
standards of excellence of a particular sport. Moderate formalism, however, does not 
make space available for this kind of dialogue; it does not provide the members of a 
sporting community with a process by which to come together and formulate the 
nonnative principles necessary to properly assess possible changes to their sport's 
constitutive rules. To produce such a space or such principles, moderate formalists 
would have to extend their theory beyond the fonnal rules-the only resources 
available to them on their view. Hence, unless formalists are willing to drop their 
claim that the fonnal rules are the only defining elements of sports, they would not be 
capable of devising a deliberative framework to guide them in evaluating possible 
modifications to their sports. Such a deliberative process is also vital if these members 
are to develop normative principles to help them protect their sport from corruption. 
Without a deliberative framework of some kind, they would have little to guide them 
in creating or altering policies that would minimize or end the use of morally 
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questionable practices on and off the field of sport. The constitutive rules of sports 
cannot, for example, help IOC members prevent vote buying from infecting the bid 
process for cities that wish to host the Olympic Games, and cannot aid in increasing 
the emphasis on academics in men's Division I intercollegiate football and basketball 
programs. 
The failure of formalism as a strong normative theory of sport leads us to a 
second group of positions that make up what Simon refers to as the conventionalist 
point of view (lntemalism 4 ). Conventionalism asserts that any complete definition 
of a sport must account for the social context in which that sport is played. In 
normative terms, this requires anyone who would pass ethical judgment on athletes' 
actions to take into consideration the customs and conventions of a particular sport in 
addition its formal rules. Conventionalists contend that while rules may govern play 
to an extent, they must be interpreted within the context of the sport. Hence, if we are 
to give a full account of a sport, we must include the influence that this context has on 
the participants of the sport. 
Although several theorists have contributed to the conventionalist attack 
against formalism, it is D' Agostino's ethos account of games that presents the most 
comprehensive case for conventionalism within the sport philosophy literature. 3 
D' Agostino defines the ethos of a game as ''those conventions determining how the 
formal rules of that game are applied in concrete circumstances" ( 42). These 
3 See Oliver Leaman, "Cheating and Fair Play in Sport," Philosophic lnqµiry In Sport, eds. 
Morgan and Meier, 2nd ed., 193-197, and Craig K. Lehman, "Can Cheaters Play the Game?," Journal of 
the Philosohy of Sport 8 ( 198 1): 41-46. 
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conventions influence the manner in which officials and athletes interpret the rules of 
a sport and, to some extent, determine the way that sport is played within a particular 
context. In a basketball game, for example, the way that officials interpret the rules of 
the sport determines which actions they perceive to be fouls and which they perceive 
to be permissible moves. These perceptions, in tum, help players determine which 
maneuvers they will use in playing the game and which they will desist from using to 
avoid fouls. 
For D' Agostino, however, the power of convention goes far beyond rule 
interpretation. D' Agostino contends that the conventions and customs of a particular 
sport authorize officials to ignore or suspend specific rules and, thus, call only those 
fouls deemed significant under the given circumstances. Turning to professional 
basketball, he offers the following explanation of this "interpretation" process: 
players and officials have, in effect, conspired to ignore certain rules of 
basketball, at least in certain situations, in order to promote certain 
interests, which they share, for instance, with team owners and 
spectators-e.g., to make the game more exciting than it would be if 
the rules were more strictly enforced ( 4 7). 
While we should be grateful to D' Agostino for bringing important issues like 
rule interpretation and the relationships between players, officials, owners and fans 
into the dialogue about fair play and sport, we must be careful not to mistake the 
descriptive strength of his account of games for normative strength. Theorists like 
Morgan (Logical Incompatibility 1 1-12) and Simon (Intemalism 5) contend that 
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although D' Agostino's account gives a sound description of what is happening in elite 
sport contests, it lacks the normative strength to tell the members of sporting 
communities what should be happening in such contests. 
The normative flaws of this account stem from the strength D' Agostino 
attributes to the customs and conventions of particular sports. In granting the ethos the 
power to ignore and override the formal rules of sports, and by not limiting its power 
in any appreciable way, he fails to provide sporting communities with a method by 
which to determine if certain rules should be ignored or overridden. Morgan argues 
that D' Agostino creates this problem for himself by denying the validity of the 
constitutive/regulative rule distinction. This move theoretically leaves officials, 
athletes and owners free to circumvent any rules of a sport that it would benefit them 
to violate (Logical Incompatibility 4). 
D' Agostino might contend that the ethos would not allow the formal rules of a 
sport to be violated in a manner that would harm the sport or promote anarchy within 
it. However, as Morgan notes, he gives us no indication of how the ethos of 
contemporary elite sport-an ethos today guided primarily by a profit- and win-at-all­
cost philosophy that endorses a variety of rules violations in the pursuit of fame, 
fortune and victory-could avoid these potential problems (Logical Incompatibility 
13- 14). Thus, if his account of games is to carry any normative weight at all, 
D' Agostino must explain how the ethos of elite sport can police itself and protect 
sports from potentially corruptive influences. 
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D� Agostino's failure to restrict the power of the ethos also makes room for 
morally questionable practices to flourish within the context of elite sport. Examples 
from chapter one demonstrate that many such practices are conventionally accepted in 
contemporary sports. Fighting is "part of the game" of NHL hockey; vote buying has 
been "the way of doing business" with the IOC; de-emphasizing academics within 
men's intercollegiate football and basketball is ''business as usual" for coaches and 
athletic directors at the Division I level; and using illegal performance-enhancing 
drugs is "keeping up with the Jonses" for international athletes. D' Agostino's account 
of games gives the members of sporting communities no method by which to weigh 
the moral and rational implications of accepting these and other morally problematic 
actions into sport. Moreover, there is no way for those who disagree with the above 
practices to voice their opinion against them. Hence, he is unable to assure those 
members that the win- and profit-at-all-cost ethos of elite sport would eliminate the 
corruptive influences that already permeate their sports or stop other such influences 
from taking root within them. 
Finally, by attributing so much power to the conventions and customs of 
sports, D' Agostino has also placed economic, political and social concerns of 
individuals and institutions on at least equal footing with the formal rules and 
structures of sports. His ethos account of sport is therefore vulnerable to Simon's 
objection that conventionalists immunize conventions and customs from criticism and, 
thus, isolate them from possible changes. Simon argues that "conventionalism in 
sport, when taken as a normative theory, implies that existing conventions are in effect 
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immune from criticism, since it is precisely those conventions which are determinative 
to begin with" (Intemalism 5). 
It thus appears that D' Agostino's ethos account of games is one that both 
endorses the maintenance of the status quo and fails to give the members of sporting 
communities any space in which to discuss and debate the pros and cons of accepting 
particular practices within their sports. Hence, it appears that, like moderate 
formalism, D' Agostino's version of conventionalism has normative weaknesses that 
hinder it as a theory of sport. 
To sum up, neither formalist nor conventionalist accounts of sport are 
normatively strong enough to help guide the moral decision making of sporting 
communities. Both theories fail to adequately account for the possibility of morally 
reforming sports by altering their existing formal structures or conventions, and 
neither gives members any framework for dealing with the substantive challenges that 
could be advanced by knowledgeable dissenters. Thus as Simon notes, "it is hard to 
see how emphasis either on existing formal rules of sport or social conventions can 
provide a basis for the resolution of some fundamental moral issues that arise in sport" 
(Internalism 5). With this determined, I now turn to another account of sport; one that 




The anti-fonnalist position focuses primarily on the individual interests and 
desires of athletes within the sporting context, contending that these should take 
precedence over the formal rules, social conventions and moral principles that might 
limit them. Two endorsers of this position, Gunter Gebauer and Terence Roberts, 
contend that the codified rules and principles of sports and the social traditions and 
conventions accepted by sporting communities do not give us a clear representation of 
the potential of sports. These elements do not reveal what sports could be if the 
members of sporting communities would free their minds from conventional thinking 
and grant athletes the freedom to redefine or recreate sports through their unique 
individual actions. For Gebauer and Roberts, it is these actions rather than those in 
accord with the rules and traditions of sports that have the power to recast sports and 
bring new life to them. Hence, the primary question for these theorists is not how to 
protect the fonnal structures and traditions of sports or how to reestablish their moral 
integrity, but how to maximize the space in which athletes may remake sports through 
the pursuit of their own individual interests. 
Gebauer believes that it is the "quest for one's chance," the attempt to gain 
advantage over opponents through individual ingenuity, that allows athletes to 
redefine their sports by raising the standards by which they and others will be judged 
within a particular sport. This quest, he contends, is a continuous obsession for 
athletes, who constantly seek to establish even a slight edge over one another both in 
training and in competition. Gebauer describes this process of advantage seeking as 
follows: 
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Gaining the advantage is of central interest to all athletes. They pursue 
this objective to the finest detail in their preparation for competition by 
enduring extensive physical conditioning, acquiring proper attitudes, 
learning and acting on experience, applying knowledge, and, in the 
competitive situation itself, mobilizing all their physical and mental 
energies and abilities ( 468). 
The "quest for one's chance" is the primary feature of what Gebauer calls the 
"internal perspective" of the athlete. This perspective is essentially the view of the 
athlete as advantage-seeker. It is a view that varies according to the individual athlete 
and sporting context in question, and, thus, is not one that can be captured by any set 
of normative rules or principles of action. Gebauer does, however, attribute normative 
power to this "internal perspective", arguing that athletes can define and redefine their 
sports through individual advantage-seeking actions. He contends that it is the 
primary task of the athletes to enhance their sports by establishing new standards of 
excellence through their individual efforts to gain advantage. From this claim, he 
further surmises that athletes and their actions should not be subjected to external 
moral codes that sport journalists and ideologists often force upon them. Such codes 
inhibit the vital advantage-seeking efforts of athletes and stifle their creative impulses 
both mentally and physically. Gebauer thus concludes that in order to preserve 
athletic creativity and facilitate the advancement of sport, the "internal perspective" of 
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athletes and their quest for advantage must play a decisive role in determining which 
actions are morally acceptable and unacceptable within particular sporting contexts 
(469-70). 
Gebauer further argues that "[a]side from a few constitutive rules and 
regulations dealing with material conditions, [ the formal rules of sport] simply draw a 
line between what is allowed and what is not" (Gebauer 468-69). He contends that, 
because the formal rules only mark this boundary, they can neither regulate what 
happens within sports nor tell athletes what can happen within them ( 469). Hence, 
Gebauer appears to grant the "internal perspective'' and the "quest for chance" 
preemptive power over both the means established by the formal rules and the 
challenges and internal goods they make possible. 
While Gebauer' s view is not without value, it suffers from normative 
inadequacies similar to those that plagued conventionalism. As you will recall, 
Morgan argued that the ethos account of games was normatively weak because it did 
not sufficiently regulate the preemptive power of the win- and profit-at-all-cost ethos 
of elite sports (Logical Incompatible 13-14 ). By endorsing the "quest for one's 
chance" as the main point of sports, Gebauer, like D' Agostino, has licensed athletes to 
violate any rules and conventions they wish in pursuit of a competitive edge. It 
appears, then, that Gebauer grants preemptive power to the "internal perspective" of 
the athlete that is similar to that which D' Agostino grants to the ethos of elite sport. 
He thus finds himself in a dilemma akin to the one D 'Agostino found himself in with 
regard to the ethos: He must either explain how advantage seeking within sport is to 
51 
be_ regulated, or admit that his account of sport gives the members of sporting 
communities precious little in the way of moral guidance-unless of course moral 
guidance never endorses actions that run counter to each individual athlete's own 
interests. 
Gebauer, however, seems perfectly comfortable with accepting what I have 
called "morally questionable practices" into sport. On his view, such practices are 
simply ways in which athletes can gain advantage, and, thus, are morally acceptable 
according to the "internal perspective" of the athlete. It is this perspective that 
Gebauer believes is the true measure of moral acceptability within sport practices. 
Hence, he might conclude here that members of sporting communities should ignore 
my above objection because I have externally imposed my own code of ethics on 
athletes and, in doing so, have failed to account for the primacy of their own "internal 
perspective." 
In attributing so much power to the "internal perspective," however, Gebauer 
has failed to account for the likelihood that not all community members would agree 
to accept particular advantage-seeking actions into their sports. Since the "internal 
perspective'' grants athletes the freedom to pursue whatever advantages they can 
secure, there is no reason to presume that community members would come to any 
consensus regarding what is permissible in training and competition and what is not­
indeed, such consensus seems besides the point. Lacking such a consensus, 
community members would require some sort of deliberative framework through 
which to discuss their various differences. Gebauer, however, fails to provide such a 
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framework, thus effectively silencing the voices of those who object to particular 
advantage-seeking actions. Without a deliberative framework, NHL players, coaches 
and officials who believe that sticks should not be used to injure or painfully 
intimidate opponents have no way of voicing their opinions against those who believe 
such actions are acceptable within the context of NHL hockey. Individuals who are 
against the use of steroids for performance enhancement are in an equally weak 
position relative to those who believe steroid use is acceptable. From the above 
argument, then, I conclude that unless Gebauer develops a deliberative framework for 
the members of sporting communities, he would consistently ignore any moral 
objections to particular actions and would privilege advantage-seeking actions over 
conventional and rule-following actions in any and all situations. 
Furthermore, Gebauer's  view is not only lacking a deliberative framework, it is 
lacking any moral point at all, unless of course we are willing to accept the idea that 
only self-interested actions can be moral actions. Since such an idea is simply 
unacceptable to those who value sports as more than a means to the end of winning, I 
contend that Gebauer's  version of anti-formalism fails to provide the members of 
sporting communities with any moral guidance whatsoever with regard to the 
advantage-seeking actions of athletes. Hence, his theory of sport cannot be considered 
a normatively strong one because it endorses an amoral, egoistic view of sports. 
Having found Gebauer' s view to be normatively lacking, I now turn to another 
anti-formalist account of sport recently presented by Terence Roberts. Like Gebauer, 
Roberts contends that it is the actions of individual athletes that primarily determine 
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what sports are and should be. Roberts, however, believes that these defining actions 
extend beyond the ones athletes use to gain advantage over opponents or raise the 
standards of excellence of their sport, to creative actions that aesthetically and/or 
stylistically alter sports in a variety of ways. Moreover, Roberts contends that if any of 
these individual actions happen to also meet public needs, these "strong poet-athletes" 
would be "redescribing" or remaking their sports as well as themselves (Sport and 
Strong Poetry 103 ). As examples of such instances, he offers us the innovations of 
cricket bowlers that, over time, changed bowling from a skill that was executed with 
an underarm throw to one that is currently executed with an overarm throw ("It's Just 
Not Cricket" 71-75). One might also add Dick Fosbury's once-unorthodox style of 
high jumping, the "Fosbury Flop", as another unique aesthetic and stylistic action that 
has revolutionized the way a sport is contested. 
To convey the significance that individual actions such as these can have for 
elite sports, Roberts adapts the arguments of Richard Rorty, the most crucial of which, 
for Roberts' purpose, is the distinction between the individual private sphere and the 
regulative public sphere of social practices and societies. Roberts contends that the 
private sphere of sporting practices, which consists of the unique, redefining actions of 
individual athletes, should take precedence over the moral and political public sphere 
which seeks to limit the scope of such actions. 
Further explanation is necessary to clarify Rorty's and Roberts' views on the 
relationship between the private and the public. According to Rorty, the public sphere 
consists of shared beliefs, values, actions and language that constitute the moral 
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identity of a practice community and its members (Postmodernist 200). The private 
sphere, on the other hand, consists of the beliefs, values, actions and language that 
individuals do not share with others in the community (Rorty, Moral Identity 194). It 
is these individualistic, idiosyncratic elements that Rorty and Roberts believe play a 
vital role in the private efforts of redescription through which individuals recreate 
themselves and, if conditions are right, their practices. Due to the primacy of these 
individual actions, the two conclude that such actions should be privileged over any 
public efforts to regulate them, and that the public sphere should be limited to the 
negotiation of political compromises that maximize individual freedom while insuring 
that members neither harm one another nor infringe upon one another's individual 
liberties. 
Applying Rorty' s public / private distinction to sport, Roberts claims that 
private efforts to creatively seek advantage, to extend a sport's standards of excellence 
or to buck convention and pursue individual experiments in style and skill are of 
primary importance in sport. This being so, the only task remaining for the public 
sphere is to address issues of fairness and justice by establishing compromises 
between individual athletes that would allow them the greatest possible freedom in 
their endeavors and would protect these personal endeavors from the possible 
infringements of others (Private Autonomy 252-53). 
Roberts' acceptance of Rorty's weak public and strong private spheres, 
however, leads to a variety of problems for his theory of sport. For by limiting public 
discourse to questions about what is fair or just, Roberts, like Gebauer and 
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D' Agostino, denies the members of sporting communities the opportunity to discuss 
and debate individual actions that conflict either with one another or with the formal 
structures or social conventions of their sports. As Morgan notes, Roberts' application 
of the Rortian weak public to sport practices precludes any discussion by community 
members of the internal goods, standards of excellence or traditions and conventions 
of the sport in relation to the unique individual actions of athletes. Sporting 
communities are therefore essentially barred from taking up issues concerning the best 
interests of their sports, including those that affect its moral integrity. The weak 
public sphere thus not only leaves the members of these communities speechless 
regarding the general moral welfare of their sports, but leaves them unable to protect 
themselves from the corruptive influences that often accompany the egoistic initiatives 
of individual athletes (Private or Public 25-26). 
Morgan contends that Roberts' adaptation of Rorty' s public / private 
distinction leads him to gloss over the fact that the public space in which we spend 
much of our lives in and outside of sports is not Rorty' s weak public sphere, but a 
"social patchwork of associations" that includes schools, professional organizations, 
self-help groups and sports (Private or Public 23-24 ). Morgan claims that 
social practices like sports are first and foremost associations founded 
on common substantive conceptions of the good that inform the 
collective aims, values, and standards of judgment of their members, of 
the practice communities formed in their name (Private or Public 24 ). 
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If sports are associations as defined here, then, Morgan contends, Roberts is 
shortchanging them by limiting the public sphere to the role of mediator. By allowing 
members of sporting communities to discuss and debate only issues pertaining to 
fairness and justice, Roberts precludes them from deliberating about the internal goods 
of their sports-those skills, strategies, challenges, standards of excellence and 
traditions that make sports the particular types of activities they are. Unless 
community members have an opportunity to reach a common understanding regarding 
what these goods are, and, in turn, are able to discuss how they should comport 
themselves with respect to them, they would, according to Morgan, have no way of 
deciding which individual actions should be accepted within their sport. In other 
words, if the members of a sporting community are only allowed to negotiate what is 
fair between athletes, they would be unable to rationally and morally weigh the acts of 
individuals against one another or against their agreed-upon conception of "the good 
of the game" to determine whether these actions should be accepted within the 
community or not. Hence, by limiting public discourse to the art of political 
compromise, Roberts denies the members of sporting communities the opportunity as 
members of associations to develop and utilize a common conception of the good for 
their sport (Private or Public 26-27). In summary, Morgan states that: 
[w]hat passes for the public side of sports on Roberts' account is only a 
simulacrum, only the shell of a substantial effective public ( defined as 
one that takes it marching orders from the good), and so, one that 
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hardly serves as a bulwark, if needed, against overarching individual 
athletic initiatives (Private or Public 26). 
It is not clear to Morgan or me why Roberts would believe that a Rortian weak 
public would be able to defend sports against corruption in the first place. The 
individual athletes he has in mind are only concerned with their own private welfare. 
Furthermore, Roberts' endorsement of Gebauer's "quest for one's chance" and his 
claim that strong poet-athletes must violate the rules and traditions of their sports in 
order to accomplish their individual initiatives, leave the impression that athletes 
should be free to do as they wish as long as they do not inordinately harm or hinder 
others in their pursuits (Morgan, Private or Public 20-21 ). Thus, it appears that by 
strongly privileging the private sphere of sports over a public sphere that is too weak 
to protect them from corruption, Roberts is advocating a form of institutional anarchy 
within sport that, as Morgan points out, bears a clear resemblance to the context of 
elite sport examined in the first chapter: 
the ideal of aesthetic freedom that drives strong poet-athletes and the 
economic freedom that drives many contemporary elite athletes, both 
give individuals the license to do as they please in sports without regard 
for their social value, to disregard the beliefs and values of others in the 
practice community as they seek their particular ends in sports (Private 
or Public 32). 
Roberts makes two attempts to reassure us that the Rortian weak public is 
capable of keeping individual pursuits from leaving sports in ruin. In the first, he 
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contends that a "continuous tension" between the private and public spheres of a sport 
will stop the rational and moral frameworks of that sport from disintegrating in the 
wake of the rampant individuality he endorses (Private Autonomy 254 ). In the 
second, Roberts claims that sports are protected from overzealous practitioners 
because, even as these mavericks attempt to radically alter them, the public belief 
system of the sporting community remains largely the same. With this system of 
rationality and morality in place, he argues, the members of the community are able to 
"rationally respond to new beliefs" offered up by individual athletes and, thus, are able 
to protect the sport from irrational and immoral actions (Roberts, Sport and Strong 
Poetry 76). 
Morgan, however, disagrees with this assessment of the relationship between 
the private and public spheres of sport. He contends that because both of Roberts ' 
claims assume the existence of a stronger, associational public, they both fall short of 
reassuring the members of sporting communities that their sports will not be 
undermined by the actions of egoistically motivated innovators. The kind of public 
sphere Roberts refers to in his reassurances would permit sporting communities to 
rationally weigh the actions of individual athletes against one another or against some 
common understanding of how athletes should participate in particular sports. It is, 
however, precisely this kind of strong public that Roberts rules out in his original 
account; the kind that would allow the members of sporting communities to publicly 
discuss matters pertaining to the welfare of their sports. As it stands, then, Roberts has 
given us no reason to believe that his weak public could either maintain the belief 
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sy�tems or rationalities of sports or, together with the private sphere, provide a 
"continuous tension" that would keep irrational or immoral actions from becoming 
part of sports. Morgan thus concludes that Roberts' reassurances are both inconsistent 
with his acceptance of the Rortian weak public and that, to escape inconsistency, he 
must either replace the weak public with the stronger, associational one just alluded to 
or devise other arguments to explain how the weak public could protect sports from 
the corruptive influences of overzealous athletes (Private or Public 30-3 1 ). 
It appears then that, like Gebauer, Roberts has not provided us with an anti­
formalist account of sport that is capable of lending normative guidance to sporting 
communities. Both of these accounts fail to adequately explain how a sport can be 
protected from the morally questionable practices that are prevalent at the elite level 
today, and, hence, do not provide sufficient normative strength to assist athletes, 
coaches, owners and administrators in a quest to maintain, establish or reestablish the 
moral integrity of their sports. The question thus remains, is there an account of sport 
that the members of sporting communities could employ in such a quest? 
Broad Internalism 
According to Simon, internalists believe that "sport has a significant degree of 
autonomy from the wider society and supports, stands for, or expresses a set of values 
of its own which may run counter to the values dominant in the culture" (Intemalism 
2). Sport philosophers like Morgan, Butcher and Schneider, Russell and Simon 
himself have recently formulated what the latter refers to as a "broad intemalist" 
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theory of sport. These theorists seek to avoid the normative flaws of more narrow 
intemalist accounts, such as those presented by formalism, by revealing i�temal 
features and principles within sports that have normative value for members of 
sporting communities. Simon contends that these features and principles are not part 
of the constitutive rules of sports, but are internal "resources" that "can be used to 
adjudicate moral issues in sports and athletics" (Intemalism 7). Since, in my 
estimation, Morgan, Russell and Simon have offered the most compelling and 
complete broad intemalist accounts to date, it is their work I chose to develop and 
critique in the final section of this chapter, beginning with Morgan's views on the 
internal logic of sport. 4 
Following Michael Walzer's lead, Morgan sets out in Leftist Theories of Sport 
to distinguish sports from other types of social practices and to show that what is 
rational and moral within sports differs from what is rational and moral within larger 
society. 5 In order to accomplish this task, he believes it is necessary "to locate internal 
principles of differentiation, that is, principles that derive from the structural and 
historical core of practices themselves" (210). According to Morgan, what 
distinguishes sports from all other social practices is an internal "gratuitous logic," 
which Suits captures in his claim that sports, as games, are ''voluntary attempt[s] to 
overcome unnecessary obstacles" (Grasshopper 41). Morgan contends that all 
modem Western sports are games of this kind, since all of them have constitutive rules 
4 For another version of broad intemalism, see Robert Butcher and Angela Schneider, "Fair 
Play as Respect for the Game," Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 25 ( 1998): 1-22. 
5 Micheal Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983) 9. 
6 1  
that "prohibit the simplest, easiest, most direct ways to achieve the goal of the game in 
favor of more complex, more difficult, more indirect ways to achieve it" (Morgan, 
Leftist Theories 2 1 1  ). 6 
It is the constitutive rules that determine how the gratuitous logic is manifested 
within particular sports. In basketball, for example, the constitutive rules prohibit 
players from dropping the ball through the hoop after climbing up a ladder or being 
lowered from the ceiling, but permit them to jump and propel the ball toward the 
basket with their hands. These rules thus provide the gratuitous logic with "the most 
basic layer of its complex social construction" by establishing the means that 
basketball players may or may not use in a contest. The gratuitous logic in turn 
informs these means, the obstacles and challenges they arrange, and the internal goods 
and experiences that these challenges make available to athletes (Morgan, Leftist 
Theories 2 1 1). 
Although the gratuitous logic is closely connected with the constitutive rules of 
sports, Morgan reminds us that it is not identical to them. The logic, he contends, is a 
socially grounded, universal feature of modem Western sports. 7 Over the last 150 
years, these primarily English and American sports and their characteristics have not 
only been introduced to a variety of cultures, but have become valued parts of these 
cultures as people have integrated them into their ways of life. 8 Morgan further 
6 For a thorough description of games, See Suits, Grasshopper 22-4 1 .  
7 For more on the characteristics of modem sports, see Allen Guttmann, From Ritual to Record 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1978). 
8 Guttmann thoroughly examines this process of diffusion in Games and Empires (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994). 
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argues, however, that the gratuitous logic that informs modem Western sports has 
become rooted within each of these cultures, and that it will continue to exist within 
them as long as they continue to value and participate in these sports. Thus, Morgan 
concludes that the gratuitous logic is both a culturally grounded and universal feature 
of modem Western sports (i.e., sports as we know them today) (Morgan, 
Ethnocentrism 86). 
Having es�blished what the gratuitous logic is and the manner in which it 
functions, we must now ask if and how the members of sporting communities can 
derive moral guidance from it. Can a socially grounded, universal logic of sport lend 
athletes, coaches and administrators normative guidance that will inform their actions 
and decision-making? Can it assist them in their deliberations about what is best for 
their sports? If Morgan is correct, the gratuitous logic can normatively assist sporting 
communities in two ways. First, it can act as a regulating principle for athletes, 
coaches and organizers as they deliberate about the means and internal goods that are 
appropriate to their sports. Second, it can help these community members determine 
whether the means of their sports should be modified and what types of modifications 
would be acceptable given the historical structures and social conventions of the sports 
and communities in question. 
Because the logic of modem Western sport favors the use of less efficient 
means in pursuit of goals, the members of sporting communities can look to it for 
assistance in changing or maintaining the obstacles that athletes must overcome in 
competition and, consequently, the internal goods and excellences that these make 
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possible. As mentioned previously, these goods and obstacles are formally established 
through athletes', officials', coaches' and administrators' adherence to the constitutive 
rules of sports. However, they are maintained or altered through the interplay of 
athletes and officials on the field of play and the decisions of sport organizers off of it. 
The interactions of these individuals therefore play an important role in detennining 
how sports are played by socially establishing the means that may be used within 
them. 
The members of sporting communities thus find themselves in a situation 
analogous to that of Suits' gamewright. In applying his craft, the gamewright must 
remember that the ways in which she limits permissible means will determine the 
range and quality of experiences available to participants by establishing the types of 
challenges they will face. She must, therefore, adeptly set these means so that they are 
neither too restrictive nor too lax. Should she fail to accomplish this task, her game 
will either disintegrate into chaos due to a lack of proscribed means or be "squeezed 
out of existence" by a wealth of them (Suits, Grasshopper 30). Similarly, the 
members of sporting communities should recognize a responsibility to protect the 
means, obstacles and internal goods of their sports, and should not flout this 
responsibility for individual or institutional profit as many in elite sport do today. 
This responsibility requires them to uphold the rules and conventions of sports by 
using the prescribed less efficient means to attain game goals. It also requires them 
not to change rules or conventional interpretations of them without reasons that 
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explain how the changes preserve or enhance the established obstacles that athletes 
face and the accompanying excellences they experience. 
It appears, then, that Morgan's gratuitous logic of modern Western sports can 
provide normative guidance to those wishing to preserve or reestablish the moral 
integrity of sport. We must note, however, that Morgan's brand of broad intemalism 
is not the only one available to sporting communities. Another version of this view 
put forth by J. S. Russell takes a different approach in attempting to provide normative 
and deliberative assistance to the members of sporting communities. Russell's view 
states that sports have internal principles-principles that are not a part of the formal 
rules, but are capable of helping the members of sporting communities to better 
understand and interpret them. 
Russell's theory is based on an analogous view that Ronald Dworkin has 
advanced in the area of jurisprudence. Dworkin contends that there are principles at 
work within legal systems that are not laws, but do help individuals understand how 
laws function and should be interpreted within particular systems. These principles 
are thus internal aspects of the legal system that, when recognized, can guide the 
actions and decisions of those interpreting laws or devising legal policies. 9 
Russell applies Dworkin' s ideas to complex scenarios from the history of 
professional baseball in hopes of distilling internal principles that are a part of sports 
in general. In these scenarios, the letter and spirit of the rules of baseball clash 
considerably and the presiding umpires are required to look beyond the rules of the 
9 For more on Dworkin's view, Law' s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 
and Taking Rights Seriously. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977). 
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game for assistance in making just and appropriate calls. Russell contends that when 
umpires are faced with such situations, they may look to Dworkin' s view of 
jurisprudence "as a rough framework for a theory of umpire discretion" that can help 
them weigh the relevant facts and make calls that are fair and appropriate under the 
circumstances (Russell 34 ). 
The general principles that constitute this framework are what facilitate the 
above process. Russell draws one of these principles from Suits' previously 
mentioned claim that sports, as games, are activities in which rules establish obstacles 
that provide specific types of challenges, experiences and internal goods to athletes. If 
the members of sporting communities value this claim, they should also recognize and 
value a more specific principle which states that "Rules should be interpreted in such a 
manner that the excellences embodied in achieving the [ . . . ] goal of the game are not 
undermined but are maintained and fostered" (Russell 34 ). Russell thus concludes 
that principles like this are identifiable parts of sports and are of normative value 
because they may be invoked by athletes, officials and organizers to protect sports and 
the challenges that define them. 
But why should we accept Russell' s  principles of sport as normative 
principles? Why should members of sporting communities refer to them when they 
have questions about what is good or right within their sports? In discussing Russell' s  
view, Simon contends that "[w]hat gives moral force to the virtues and excellences 
required in sport is their connection within the practice to respect for certain qualities 
of human beings" (Intemalism 10). Principles like those advanced by Russell can 
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thus help 1:15 recognize, for example, the value of competing against good and worthy 
opponents. In establishing the importance of such adversaries, Simon reminds us that 
the obstacles of sports are actually presented to athletes by opponents who challenge 
their abilities. By providing each other with strong challenges, skilled, well-matched 
opponents can also make available to one another the internal goods and excellences 
that come with close, well-played contests ( e.g., the experience of applying specific 
skills and strategies under pressure) (lnternalism 10-1 1). Hence, on Simon's 
account, those athletes and coaches interested in the excellences and internal goods of 
their sports should value worthy adversaries and act in a manner that demonstrates 
their respect for them. 
What does it mean for athletes to show respect for opponents? For Simon, it 
means that athletes must at least adhere to the rules and conventions of their sports. 
Beyond that, Simon also suggests that respectful athletes will facilitate the good play 
of opponents by establishing conditions of competition that will allow each competitor 
to present the others with the strongest possible challenges. This means he or she will, 
for example, avoid cheating and the use of unsportsmanlike actions like trash-talking 
or unnecessary physical intimidation that might throw a particular opponent off his or 
her game. Simon thus concludes that those athletes, coaches and organizers who value 
the internal goods of their sports will seek out strong, worthy opponents to challenge 
them, while those primarily interested with external goods (e.g., fame and fortune) 
may forsake such opponents in favor of lesser ones or sink to dubious means in order 
to win (lnternalism 11 ). 
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The broad intemalist viewpoints offered by Simon, Russell and Morgan meet 
several of the criteria necessary for a strong normative framework of sport. They offer 
principles (in Russell's case) or a "gratuitous logic" (in Morgan's case) that members 
of sporting communities may use to determine which values, actions and decisions 
would best facilitate the achievement of the internal goods of their sport. These key 
normative elements may help members to recognize sound challenges to their 
accepted ways of thinking and potential threats to or problems within their sport or 
community that need to be addressed. Finally, members may utilize these same 
principles and logic in the process of maintaining or altering rules, conventions and 
policies in order to protect the moral integrity of their sport and the standards and 
traditions that make a sport the unique type of activity it is. 
There is, however, one criterion of a strong normative framework that the 
aforementioned broad intemalist theories do not provide: a forum within which the 
members of sporting communities may discuss and debate issues pertaining to the 
welfare of their sport. Although all the broad intemalists mentioned here allude to the 
importance of such a deliberative framework, none of them draw out exactly what this 
framework is or how it is to function. While these theories might be extended so that 
they create deliberative space for communities, there may be other philosophical 
theories from outside of sport that can do this work more effectively if applied to 
sport. 
In chapter three, I examine an account of sport fashioned from the virtue 
theory of philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre. This new version of broad intemalism is 
68 
intended t� supply the members of sporting communities with a clear deliberative 
framework that rephrases all discourse concerning the sport in terms of its internal 
goods and standards of excellence and helps members remain vigilant and 
openminded when discussing how their sport is to be played and regulated. 
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Chapter IV 
A Maclntyrean Theory of Sport 
As I have argued, the realm of elite sport is dominated by a win- and profit-at­
all-costs ethos that is grounded in instrumental rationality. Athletes, owners and 
administrators reason instrumentally in order to justify placing their own interests 
ahead of the internal goods, standards of excellence, valued traditions and moral 
integrity of their sport and sporting community. Those who accept this manner of 
reasoning seem unaware that there are other ways to think about sport; ways that 
appear foreign to them because of the pervasive nature of instrumental reasoning and 
the belief that it is their individual interests and the economic or political interests of 
their team, league or governing body that are most important within the context of 
elite sport. 
In this chapter, I present a different method of reasoning that the members of 
elite sporting communities could apply to the problems and issues facing their sports. 
This other form of reasoning-the Aristotelian form of practical reasoning endorsed 
by Alasdair MacIntyre-focuses upon those skills, strategies, standards and traditions 
that may be valued over personal or institutional interests by the members of sporting 
communities. I begin the chapter by briefly contrasting Maclntyre's view of practical 
reasoning with instrumental forms of practical reasoning. I attempt to show the 
differences between practical and instrumental reasoning by examining MacIntyre' s 
distinction between social practices and institutions. In this regard, I analyze how 
institutions, including governing bodies like the NCAA, IOC and professional leagues 
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like the NFL and MLB, emphasize the instrumental reasoning that leads individuals to 
pursue their own interests through sport. In contrast, I then show how the members of 
practice communities can use practical reasoning to emphasize the best interests of the 
sport over individual or institutional pursuits of wealth, power and status. 
Once the practice / institution distinction is established, I assess the process by 
which MacIntyre believes apprentices come to understand the reasoning of their 
chosen practice and to transform their own interests into those of the practice 
community. In sport, this process requires apprentices to not only understand the 
traditional reasoning used by veteran members of the sporting community, but, at least 
initially, to accept this reasoning and the internal goods and standards of excellence in 
which it is grounded as their own. 
Finally, I demonstrate how the members of sport practice communities avoid 
charges of ethnocentrism and normative ethical relativism by developing the skills of 
Maclntyrean "independent practical reasoning." In developing these skills, the 
members of a sport practice community learn to recognize salient challenges to their 
community's way of reasoning and to question that reasoning themselves in order to 
reveal and solve moral and rational problems within their sports. Before beginning the 
examination, however, it would be beneficial to have a better understanding of 
practical reasoning in general and of MacIntyre' s Aristotelian brand of practical 
reasoning in particular. 
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Practical and Instrumental Reasoning 
According to Audi's simple definition, practical reasoning is "reasoning 
undertaken to determine what to do" (25). Through such reasoning, we arrive at those 
actions we have good reasons to do. We use practical reasoning to make everyday 
decisions about what we should eat, how we should work, and about which actions are 
morally right in given situations. To use practical reasoning effectively, however, we 
must understand what a good reason for action is. Philosophers have developed 
theories of practical reasoning to help us better comprehend the difference between 
good and bad reasons for action. Postow refers to such theories as "reason theories"­
theories that attempt to explain "what, ultimately, there is reason to do" or "what 
considerations we ought to be guided by" when we act ( 1 ). 
Practical reasoning is to be contrasted with what Audi calls "theoretical 
reasoning," or "reasoning undertaken to determine what is the case" (25). This latter 
type of reasoning is the reasoning of science; reasoning that is used to determine what 
is true about the world. Although practical reasoning theories, like scientific theories, 
are typically cognitivist in nature, they differ in that they attempt to objectively ground 
morality in the practical reasoning of human beings rather than the theoretical 
reasoning of science (Darwall et al. 131). Over the centuries, a variety of practical 
reasoning theories have been developed, each with its own idea of what a sound 
reason for action is. Darwall, Gibbard and Railton have categorized the most 
influential contemporary theories as being either Hobbesian or Kantian, according to 
whether they view practical reasoning as, to use Postow' s words, a more "agent-
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dependen�" or "agent-independent" enterprise. Hobbesian theorists, such as David 
Gauthier and Kurt Baier, believe that sound reasons for action are those that give 
individual agents the best potential of achieving their interests. 1 In Hobbesian 
theories, the desires and goals of the individual are thus the "touchstone of practical 
reasons"; the things from which agents must reason if they are to be considered 
rational. To risk the fulfillment of these is irrational according to Hobbesian theorists 
(Darwall et al. 132). Kantian views, such as those advanced by Thomas Nagel and 
Alan Gewirth, seek to objectively ground moral reasoning in more "agent­
independent" principles of practical reasoning, rather than in the "agent-dependent" 
interests emphasized by Hobbesian theorists (Darwall et al. 137).2 
While the above distinction is a useful one for those categorizing contemporary 
theories, it is of limited use to those studying practical reasoning in elite sport. From 
the examination of this context in chapter one, we know that individuals in elite sport 
tend to reason instrumentally; that is, they tend to prioritize their individual interests 
ahead of the goods that represent their sport's best interests. They are thus agent­
dependent reasoners, but can only loosely be termed Hobbesian practical reasoners 
because, in the absence of strong authority, many are willing to risk severe sanctions 
to secure advantages over competitors and to gamble lesser but substantial economic 
gains in search of greater ones. In intercollegiate athletics, administrators and coaches 
1 See Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958) and 
David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) and "Reason and 
Maximization," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1975): 41 1 -34. 
2 See Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) 
and Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
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are willing to risk violating NCAA recruiting regulations in order to sign talented high 
school players. In professional sport, player's unions and owners are not content to 
share the wealth available to them through the sport. Instead, of negotiating equitably, 
each group schemes and fights to secure the largest economic gains possible without 
regard for the opposing side. Practical reasoning in elite sport is, therefore, not based 
on Hobbesian agreements, but on doing what is necessary to win or maximize profits. 
MacIntyre presents a model of this kind of instrumental reasoning in his 
portrayal of the "liberal individualist" tradition of practical reasoning (Practical 
Rationalities 129-30; Whose Justice? Which Rationality 326-48). He contends that 
contemporary philosophers from this tradition, including Paul Churchland and Alvin 
Goldman, view rationality as something to be attributed to persons as individuals-as 
agents who seek to attain their own interests separate from a specific social order­
and that practical rationality can be achieved by agents "only in so far as they are able 
to implement their own preferences" (Practical Rationalities 129). 3 Such thinkers also 
tend to view practical reasoning theories as ahistorical theories that may be applied to 
moral issues without reference to the particular socio-historical context in which they 
were developed (Practical Rationalities 120). Consequently, in their own theories, 
they present us with agents who are detached from any particular context and 
introduce them to us at the very moment they are about to make practical judgments. 
By doing so, these theorists present practical reasoners to us "as if [ they were] 
3 
See Paul M. Churchland, "The Logical Character of Action Explanations," Philosophical 
Review 79 ( 1970) 214-36, and Alvin Goldman, A Theoty of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentic-Hall, 1970. 
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detached from any conception of or perception of the good or goods" (Practical 
Rationality 129). Accordingly, MacIntyre argues that such views permit individual 
agents in "liberal individualist societies" like America to seek their preferences 
without reference to any set of common goods that they share with others in their 
societies. In such societies, 
each person is entitled to express his or her preferences and the 
institutions which determine public discourse and decision-making are 
committed to taking no account of how preferences are arrived at. [ . . .  ]
All preferences of all individuals are to be weighed in the same balance 
and accorded the same respect no matter whose they are or what their 
grounding (MacIntyre, Practical Rationalities 129). 
Although the above may not be an accurate description of liberal societies, it is 
an accurate description of the situation in elite sport today. Players, owners and 
organizers consistently pursue individual preferences through their sport, indifferent as 
to whether their actions are or are not good for the sport or sporting community. 
Public discourse within particular communities takes little account of whether an 
individual's or franchise's preferences are in the best interest of the sport, except in 
cases where the best economic interests of the sport are at stake. In these cases, most 
would primarily contest for a greater share of the wealth made available by the sport's 
commercial standing, giving only secondary consideration to the interests of the sport 
itself. A clear example of this process occurs in labor negotiations and disputes, when 
athletes and owners strive to improve their own financial positions without 
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considering the validity of the other side's point of view or the effects that a lockout or 
strike might have on their sports. Thus we see how the members of elite sporting 
communities use the instrumental forms of practical reasoning MacIntyre attributes to 
the liberal individualist tradition to further their own interests without regard for the 
good of their sport or sporting community. 
What is most alarming about the above observations is not that elite athletes, 
coaches, owners and administrators are reasoning instrumentally with regard to their 
sports, but, rather, that they fail to recognize the existence of other valid forms of 
practical reasoning. These theories are generally dismissed by them as being too 
idealistic or as being inadequate for or unnecessary within the context of elite sport. 
To accept these kind of claims, however, is to also accept that (a) one need only look 
to one's preferences as guides to moral action, and (b) the action that is most 
advantageous for one will be the morally right action in any given situation. I have 
already established in my critique of conventionalist and anti-formalist theories, 
however, that the prudent action is not always a moral action, and that the 
advantageous action is not necessarily one that is fair or just or honest. Hence, it 
seems we must look to something beyond our individual preferences if we are to 
establish, maintain or reestablish the moral integrity of our social practices, including 
sport. In addition, if a theory of practical rationality is to help us understand why we 
morally ought to act in a specific manner, it must be more than simply a theory of 
instrumental rationality. In other words, if a theory of practical rationality is going to 
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tell us what normatively should be done, it must do more than describe what is being 
done or prescribe what is most beneficial to us. 
But what is the nonnative strength of Maclntyre's theory of practical 
reasoning? Can it help the members of sporting communities and other social practice 
communities to protect or reestablish the moral integrity of their practices? 
MacIntyre' s process of practical reasoning is quite different from the instrumental 
reasoning processes of contemporary practical reasoning theories. MacIntyre 
subscribes to an Aristotelian fonn of practical reasoning that emphasizes the 
importance of the internal goods of excellence of practices-the things that make 
social practices like sports unique-rather than the individual or institutional interests 
of the members of practice communities. Unlike its instrumental counterpart, 
MacIntyre' s brand of Aristotelian practical reasoning accounts for what Morgan has 
referred to as the "associational character and content" of social practices like sports 
and the human relationships within them (Private or Public 24 ). So understood, 
rationality is not something to be achieved individually, but something that can only 
be achieved in conjunction with the other members of a practice community. Put 
another way, Maclntyre's Aristotelian practical rationality is a concept grounded in 
community rather than individuality (Practical Rationalities 12 1 ). 
Unlike many of his contemporaries, MacIntyre believes theories of practical 
reasoning are historical in character. He contends that they vary with the values of 
people, which, in turn, vary according to time and place. Hence, these theories should 
not be thoughtlessly decontextualized and applied willy-nilly. On the contrary, they 
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should be recognized as ways of thinking that developed out of and flourished within 
specific socio-historical contexts and that can flourish once again under similar 
conditions (Practical Rationalities 120, 1 3 1-33). These ways of reasoning are 
partially constitutive of what MacIntyre refers to as "traditions." He defines a 
tradition as a "historically extended, socially embodied argument [ . . .  ] in part about the 
goods which constitute that tradition" (After Virtue 222). This argument changes 
over time as the reasoning of the practitioners is challenged and modified. It is 
through a tradition that a specific understanding of a practice and its reasoning about 
the goods that should be pursued through it are conveyed to new generations of 
practitioners. Hence, it is by this process of transmission that practices themselves are 
sustained or, if well sustained, come to flourish (After Virtue 22 1 -22). 
The Aristotelian tradition of practical reasoning is one historical tradition of 
thought. In Maclntyre's eyes, Aristotelianism is "the tradition of practical rationality" 
(Knight 12). It is "the tradition that articulates the kind of teleological reasoning 
exemplified by those who act in pursuit of goods of excellence internal to social 
practices" (Knight 12). Aristotelian practical reasoning flourished within the polis of 
Ancient Greece. Like all practical reasoning theories, it carries out two primary social 
functions : (a) it guides and directs the actions of the members of a community, and 
(b) it enables these members to interpret the actions of others within the community. 
The importance of the interpretive function of practical reasoning should not 
be underestimated. It allows us to determine when others have reasoned well or 
poorly, when they have acted upon good reasons and when they have not, within the 
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context o( the practice. MacIntyre sums up the significance of this interpretive aspect 
as follows: 
Every mode of practical reasoning is also a mode of social 
interpretation. For an individual either to be or to appear rational is 
then for that individual to participate in the norm-governed transactions 
and relationships of a particular institutionalized social order. Hence 
'rational' is not a predicate to be applied to individuals qua individuals, 
but only as individuals qua participants of particular social orders 
embodying particular conceptions of rationality. It is only in so far as 
social orders embody conceptions of what it is to be rational that 
individuals are able to evaluate themselves and others as more or less 
rational (Practical Rationalities 120-21 ). 
MacIntyre further notes that Aristotelian practical reasoning is only possible in 
so far as actions within social practices like architecture, farming, painting and sports 
are directed toward the internal goods of excellence of these practices. As I have 
established in the case of sport, these internal goods of excellence include the skills, 
strategies, standards and traditions that make each sport a unique form of athletic 
competition. Members of practice communities should recognize such goods as the 
common or shared goods of their practices; as the ultimate goods of these practices 
that should guide their reasoning and "provide both activity and enquiry within each 
practice with their telos" (Practical Rationalities 123). Knight nicely sums up 
Aristotle's  and Maclntyre's views of practical rationality as follows: 
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To be human is to act rationally in a society with others. This involves 
identifying a good to be pursued, identifying the action most likely to 
secure that good under present conditions, and therefore acting 
accordingly ( 1 3  ). 
The above explanation ofMaclntyre's form of Aristotelian practical reasoning 
gives us a basic understanding of how it differs from instrumental brands of reasoning. 
To better comprehend how a person reasons and acts rationally within a practice, 
however, it is necessary to examine the process of practical reasoning more closely. 
Learning to reason soundly within a practice requires that one be introduced to the 
best standards of the community's reasoning by those who are well versed in it. As an 
apprentice, a novice discovers the internal goods and standards of excellence of the 
practice and, according to MacIntyre, first subjugates and then attunes his or her 
interests to these goods and standards. It is through this transformative process that 
apprentices learn the actions that are rational and irrational within the practice. On 
Maclntyre's view, then, 
to learn to be rational is to be initiated into and trained in the habits of 
action and judgment which dispose one to be so moved. So also to be 
rational as a member of a particular social order is to participate in 
some particular community in the relevant ways and to be moved by 
the acknowledged or to be acknowledged good reasons of that 
particular social order (Practical Rationalities 12 1  ). 
80 
�le the development of an appreciation and understanding of a practice's 
internal goods of excellence is an important step in learning to reason practically, it is 
not the only one that is necessary. MacIntyre believes that the members of a practice 
community should not blindly accept these goods, the virtues that facilitate their 
attainment, or the actions to be done in their name. Moreover, they should not take for 
granted that the reasoning of the practice is as strong as it can be. On the contrary, 
community members must develop the abilities to criticize the goods, actions, values 
and reasoning of the practice and to recognize the valid criticisms of these made by 
others if they are to be capable of recognizing and solving moral and rational problems 
within their sport. In Maclntyre's words, they must develop the skills of 
"independent practical reasoning, which he describes as 
the ability and the willingness to evaluate the reasons for action 
advanced to one by others, so that one makes oneself accountable for 
one's endorsements of the practical conclusions of others as well as 
one's own conclusions (Dependent Rational Animals 105). 
It is the development of independent practical reasoning skills that keeps the 
members of a practice community from, to use Simon's term, "immunizing" the ends, 
means, values and reasoning of the community from either internal or external 
criticism (Internalism 5). Independent practical reasoners consistently monitor their 
own reasoning as well as the reasoning of others within the community to ensure that 
these are practically sound. They also examine the internal goods and standards of 
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e�cellence accepted by the practice community to ensure that the practice's ultimate 
ends or te/oi are the ones the community should be pursuing. 
In summary, Alasdair Maclntyre' s  Aristotelian view of practical reasoning 
presents rationality as something belonging to individuals as members of social 
practice communities. Through the recognition of the internal goods of excellence and 
the virtues shared by members of the practice community and the transformative 
process through which individuals come to accept these goods and virtues as their 
own, apprentices learn not only to understand the reasoning of the community, but to 
act upon it. By further acquiring the skills of an independent practical reasoner, 
members learn to critically assess the rationality of the community rather than 
obediently accepting its reasoning when it is inconsistent, unsound or does not 
represent the best interests of the practice. Maclntyre's Aristotelian practical 
reasoning thus differs from instrumental forms of practical reasoning in that it stresses 
the importance of public discourse regarding the ends for which actions are 
undertaken as well as the actions carried out in pursuit of these ends. For MacIntyre, 
these ends are not individual but shared ends and are pursued as the goods of the 
practice rather than as individual goods. He thus endorses a type of public discourse 
regarding the internal goods of excellence of practices that could not take place within 
communities emphasizing instrumental rationality; communities in which individual 
preferences trump collective deliberations of the good (Practical Rationalities 129). 
In communities accepting the Aristotelian form of practical rationality, such discourse 
plays a necessary role in the deliberative process through which the rationality of the 
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practice and the internal goods of excellence that are its te/oi are formulated, altered 
and accepted. 
Having demonstrated the difference between Maclntyre's form of Aristotelian 
practical reasoning and instrumental reasoning, it is now necessary to develop the 
former into a detailed account of sport, to see if it will provide us with the strong 
normative framework for sporting practices that other theories have not. 
Sports, Social Practices and Institutions 
The potential normative strength of a Maclntyrean theory of sport is rooted in 
the distinction he recognizes between social practices and their internal goods of 
excellence, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, social institutions and the external 
goods of power, wealth and status, which ideally support but often end up corrupting 
practices like sports. As I intend to demonstrate, this distinction is common to the 
context of elite sport, and can help the members of a particular sporting community to 
comprehend, discuss and solve the moral and rational problems they recognize within 
the sport or community. If this examination proves successful, it should also provide 
us with a stronger understanding and appreciation of the explanatory and normative 
power of a Maclntyrean account of sport. 
As we have already seen, MacIntyre conceives of practices as consisting of 
both the social relationships existing within "networks of giving and receiving" 
(Dependent Rational Animals 99) and the internal goods and standards of excellence 
that, as the foci of these relationships, "provide both activity and enquiry within each 
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practice with their telos" (Practical Rationalities 123 ). This view is captured in 
Maclntyre's earlier account of social practices in After Virtue, in which he defines a 
social practice as 
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that fonn of activity are 
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence 
which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity ( 1 87). 
MacIntyre seems to recognize sports as just such activities. In After Virtue, he 
presents football ( 187) and cricket ( 191)  as examples of social practices. It is thus safe 
to assume that he would accept any of the sports we have previously mentioned as 
social practices as well. Like football and cricket, all of these sports, including the 
events of international athletic festivals such as the Olympic Games, have their own 
internal goods of excellence-their own skills, strategies, standards of excellence and 
traditions that make them unique. These goods are the ultimate ends of sports as 
social practices; the historically established "goods of the game" that athletes, coaches, 
owners and administrators must either commit themselves to or debate in their efforts 
to maintain the moral integrity of their sports. It is these internal goods of excellence, 
according to MacIntyre, that the members of a practice community must subordinate 
themselves to if they are to transform their own interests into those of the practice; and 
it is these goods they must learn to scrutinize if they are to improve the moral and 
rational standing of that practice. I expand upon the transformative and deliberative 
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processes !)fMaclntyre's theory later in this chapter. First, however, it is necessary to 
attain a clearer understanding of these internal goods of excellence that are so pivotal 
to the development of a Maclntyrean theory of sport. 
MacIntyre recognizes two types of goods that are associated with social 
practices like sports. External goods are goods like money, power and prestige that 
are only contingently associated with specific practices and can be secured through a 
variety of activities. Internal goods are those goods that are inherently parts of 
practices as they are formally organized and participated in. MacIntyre refers to these 
inherent goods as "internal" because he contends that they can only be specified in 
terms of the particular practice of which they are a part and are only available to 
participants in the practice or to those well acquainted with it (After Virtue 1 88-89). 
The validity of this second claim is in question and will be examined further once the 
distinction between internal and external goods has been clarified. I now turn to an 
example presented by MacIntyre that also demonstrates the importance of these two 
types of goods for sport practices and practitioners. 
In After Virtue, MacIntyre develops his distinction between internal and 
external goods through the example of a young boy learning to play chess. This 
hypothetical youngster is ambivalent about learning to play, but has quite a sweet 
tooth and no way to obtain candy. MacIntyre bribes the boy into learning the game by 
guaranteeing him fifty cents worth of candy each week he plays with him, and offering 
to double this windfall if the boy should achieve the difficult task of defeating him. 
The candy in this instance is an external good; it is not something that is essentially 
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part of chess, but, rather, a contingent part of an agreement that might have been made 
in conjunction with other practices like bridge or tennis (After Virtue 1 88). 
With candy as incentive, the boy not only plays chess with MacIntyre, but 
plays it competitively. However, there is nothing in this example to persuade the boy 
not to cheat if he knows he will not be caught; that is, there are no internal reasons for 
him to obey the rules of the game. Such reasons are only available to those pursuing 
the internal goods of a practice through its standards of excellence, and, hence, are not 
yet available to this young man because he is playing only for the instrumental 
purpose of obtaining candy. As MacIntyre notes, however, this boy's appreciation of 
the internal goods of chess may develop with the passage of time: 
[Hopefully,] there will come a time when the child will find in these 
goods specific to chess, in the achievement of a certain highly 
particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive 
intensity, a new set of reasons, reasons now not just for winning on a 
particular occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the game of 
chess demands (After Virtue 188). 
We can certainly imagine an example similar to this one involving a 
hypothetical young girl whose father is trying to teach her the game of baseball. The 
father has signed his daughter up for pee-wee league, but finds her to be apathetic 
about playing baseball. Rather than giving in to her right away, the father strikes a 
deal with her. After each game in which she tries her best, they will go to her favorite 
restaurant, Punchy' s Pizm. At first, this obvious bribe prompts the child to put forth 
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her best effort in games to earn her slice of Punchy's pepperoni-an external good 
only contingently associated with the sport of baseball. As time passes, however, the 
little girl grows to love baseball. She can't wait to get to the park on Saturdays and 
practices as often as she can. She aspires to become as good as the best players in the 
league, whose batting and fielding skills she has come to admire. She even asks her 
dad to take her to a minor league baseball game instead of Punchy' s, where she 
watches every pitch of the game instead of playing with the other children under the 
bleachers. She focuses primarily on the second basemen to learn how to play her 
chosen position "like a pro." Thus, she has come to appreciate the internal goods and 
standards of excellence that baseball has to offer rather than the external goods that 
her dad used to interest her in the game. Although she still enjoys a good slice of 
Punchy' s pepperoni now and then, she now enjoys the sport of baseball on its own 
merits. 
From the above examples, we can see why MacIntyre would claim that the 
unique and highly specific internal goods of excellence of practices must be 
experienced within the contexts of their practices to be completely understood. One 
could object, however, that the concept of checkmate and the skills of fielding and 
hitting a baseball can be understood and appreciated to some extent by those only 
marginally acquainted with the games of chess and baseball respectively. Although 
they may be able to generally appreciate the experience of receiving hard-earned 
rewards or using strategies to accomplish a goal, these individuals would not know the 
experience of putting an opponent into checkmate after a grueling four-hour match or 
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be_ able to appreciate the strategy used to achieve checkmate. Likewise, those who 
know little about baseball might recognize the difficulty of hitting a good curve ball or 
turning a double play at second base, but, lacking playing experience or a strong 
spectator's knowledge, would not have a full understanding of what is physically and 
mentally required to accomplish these tasks in competition. It is in this way that 
participants in practices like baseball and chess or those well acquainted with such 
practices are in a somewhat privileged position with regard to the understanding of the 
internal goods of excellence of specific practices. 
Does this mean that those lacking such "strong" knowledge of a practice 
cannot make valid observations about the rationality or morality of the actions 
endorsed by a practice community? Although veteran participants and others who are 
well acquainted with a sport and its context certainly have an advantage over less 
familiar observers, the latter group may still have sound observations to make 
regarding the actions and decisions made within a sporting community. Some people 
may lack knowledge about the sport of hockey, for example, but still recognize that 
players who use their sticks to injure opponents are acting in a morally reprehensible 
manner within that sport. Others may successfully draw an analogy between hockey 
and sports they are well acquainted with and conclude that, since it is unethical to use 
injurious tactics in sports like soccer and basketball, it will also be unethical to utilize 
such tactics in hockey. Thus, we see that it is possible for those with less than 
extensive knowledge about a sport practice to make valid judgments concerning that 
practice and the rationality and morality of actions endorsed within it. 
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Returning once again to MacIntyre' s distinction between internal and external 
goods, it is necessary to develop a stronger understanding of the latter and their value 
and attraction for the members of sport practice communities. While internal goods of 
excellence are what give sport practices their intrinsic worth, MacIntyre contends that 
external goods like wealth, status and power are merely contingent additions to 
practices that, at best, help sustain them and, at worst, corrupt the practices they were 
created to serve (After Virtue 1 88). He further notes that external goods are goods 
that, when achieved, belong to an individual or group (After Virtue 190). In sport, 
external goods are more often than not tied to the goods that only winners are 
awarded; that is, to the goods that only one individual or team can attain in a game or a 
season. When we take into account the number of teams and individual athletes that 
are involved in elite sport, it is clear that the external goods that accompany winning 
are scarce goods that many desire but few attain. And when we consider that these 
goods are the primary focus of the instrumental reasoning used almost exclusively by 
today's athletes, coaches, owners and administrators, it becomes clear that external 
goods are not only scarce, but also dominant forces within contemporary elite sport. 
Here, MacIntyre recognizes a key difference between external and internal 
goods, which he expresses in the following manner: 
External goods are [ . . .  ] characteristically objects of competition in 
which there must be losers as well as winners. Internal goods are 
indeed the outcome of competition to excel, but it is characteristic of 
them that their achievement is good for the whole community who 
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participate in the practice. So when Turner transformed the seascape in 
painting or W.G. Grace advanced the art of batting in cricket in quite a 
new way, their achievement enriched the whole relevant community 
( After Virtue 190-9 1 ). 
In other words, the pursuit of internal goods of excellence, although 
competitive, can benefit a whole practice community by raising the standards of 
excellence within their particular practice. Thus, when Dick Fosbury revolutionized 
high jumping with his controversial but more efficient "Fosbury Flop," and when 
Nolan Ryan broke the single-season and all-time records for strikeouts for a baseball 
pitcher, each altered the standards by which high jumpers and pitchers would be 
measured and, in so doing, significantly improved their respective sporting practices 
for contemporary and future participants alike. 
Must external goods influence the members of sporting communities 
negatively? MacIntyre does not believe that such goods necessarily drive individuals 
to do what is in their own best interests rather than the game's. However, because 
wealth, power and prestige are all scarce and dominant goods within the context of 
elite sport, individuals are often willing to forsake the internal goods of the practice in 
their decision-making in order to attain them. Owners and administrators, for 
example, are willing to change rules or traditional league or playoff structures to 
attract more money to their sports. As I observed in chapter one, governing bodies like 
the NCAA and IOC, and professional leagues like the NFL, NBA, NHL and MLB use 
instrumental reasoning to justify the accumulation of external goods, often without 
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strong co�sideration for the internal goods, standards of excellence and traditions that 
make their sports unique and meaningful practices. 
MacIntyre recognizes the relationship between external goods and institutions 
in After Virtue. He contends that institutions are primarily concerned with the 
acquisition of external goods that ideally should support social practices and their 
internal goods of excellence. It is the task of institutions _to acquire wealth and 
resources for practices, and to develop programs of rewards through which to 
distribute external goods like money, prestige and power. However, the lure of these 
scarce goods can and often does compel participants to forsake their practice's rules, 
standards of excellence and traditions. To quote MacIntyre: 
Indeed so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions-and 
consequently of the goods external to the goods internal to the practice 
in question-that institutions and practices characteristically form a 
single causal order in which the ideals and the creativity of the practice 
are always vulnerable to. the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which 
the cooperative care for common goods of the practice is always 
vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution (After Virtue 194 ). 
The relationship between sporting practices and their institutions is a pivotal 
one for those who would help protect the former from the potentially corruptive 
influences of the latter. On Maclntyre's view, the institutions of sport should support 
sporting practices rather than coopt them; they should give them the economic, social 
and political support necessary for their flourishing rather than overemphasizing 
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wealth, power, status and other institutional concerns to the point that they degrade 
them. 
Now that a clear distinction has been made between the internal goods of sport 
practices and the external goods that sporting institutions favor, I shift the focus to the 
transformative and deliberative processes of MacIntyre' s theory of practical reasoning. 
A thorough examination of these processes demonstrates the manner in which 
practical reasoning is learned and carried out by members of a sport practice 
community and elucidates the skills of independent practical reasoning that allow 
these members to soundly critique inappropriate forms of reasoning within a 
community. 
Transformation and Deliberation within Sport Practice Communities 
According to MacIntyre, practices are dependent upon new practitioners 
(apprentices) for their flourishing. It is these individuals to whom community 
members must transmit the shared goods and values of the practice and who, in tum, 
must learn not only to recognize such goods, but to subjugate their own interests, 
attitudes and desires to them in order to learn to act rationally within the practice. In 
learning to reason as members of a specific practice community, apprentices acquire 
new "habits of action and judgment" as part of the transformative process through 
which the internal interests and values of the sport become those of the apprentices. 
MacIntyre describes the general process of transformation as follows: 
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It is in so far as [apprentices'] desires are thus reworked that in the 
realm of the practice at least they are moved only by those reasons for 
action which direct them toward the goods of the practice. Hence, the 
question of whether or not something is a good reason for action is and 
comes to be understood as independent of the will or preferences of any 
particular individual (Practical Rationalities 121  ). 
As this transformation progresses, the shared internal goods of a sport are not 
simply accepted by new participants and prioritized ahead of their individual desires. 
The interests of the practice literally become those of the individuals, so that any 
actions undertaken by apprentices within the practice would initiate from its internal 
goods of excellence and would thus be in the best interests of the sport as interpreted 
by its practice community. When this transformation is complete, administrators, for 
example, would refer to the internal goods, standards of excellence and traditions of 
their sports as their own interests, and would refer to them when making decisions 
concerning the welfare of the sport. They would hence look more closely at any 
proposed changes, such as changes to the rules of the sport or to its traditional playoff 
structure, to determine how they might affect the sport and its historical standards of 
excellence; how they might, for instance, affect the ways in which the game is played 
or a champion is decided. In other words, these organizers would no longer view 
sports primarily as commodities, but as socially and historically grounded practices to 
be valued for their own particular goods and standards of excellence. 
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According to MacIntyre, however, apprentices cannot become independent 
practical reasoners within a practice community unless they can explain why the 
actions endorsed by its members are rational within the community (Dependent 
Rational Animals I 05). But why, he asks, is it necessary for members to develop 
"chain[s] of justificatory reasoning," when members of the community are seldom 
called upon to produce the presupposed reasons for their virtuous actions within the 
practice? Because practical reasoning is the reasoning of the group, there will be 
conflicts within the community concerning how members can best conceive of and 
achieve its internal goods. MacIntyre contends that it is these chains of reasoning that 
clarify the positions of those involved in the dispute, so that a rational consensus can 
be reached. He also points out that it is these attempts to deduce rational actions from 
the shared goods of the practice that demonstrate the importance of common ends for 
Aristotelian practical reasoners. For if discourse between practice community 
members is to be fruitful, these individuals must fundamentally agree upon the internal 
goods of the practice. Without at least a basic agreement of what these goods are, 
questions concerning the rationality of actions cannot be coherently answered because, 
on Maclntyre,s view, actions within a practice can only be judged rational to the 
extent that they are means to the achievement of the internal goods of excellence of 
that practice. Hence, if community members are to determine the rationality of actions 
within their practice, they must first agree upon the common or shared goods that 
stand as the teloi of that practice (Dependent Rational Animals 106-07). 
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F �llowing MacIntyre' s view, then, the members of a sport practice community 
should look to their sport's constitutive rules and challenges, skills and strategies, and 
standards and traditions to locate the internal goods of excellence of their practice. It 
is these goods that represent the common set of ends they share with one another. 
These are the ultimate ends to which members should order their individual interests. 
In order to reproduce a "chain of justificatory reasoning"' that is representative 
of a community's practical reasoning, a member must understand why, given the 
common goods of the practice, it is rational or irrational to pursue a specific course of 
action. Such a chain can be presented as an Aristotelian syllogism in which the 
rational action or set of actions is simply deduced from the internal goods of 
excellence of the practice. The major premise of the syllogism is a statement 
pertaining to these common goods as the ultimate goods of the practice. This 
statement is formulated as a conditional, with the end in question as the antecedent and 
the means to its attainment as the consequent (e.g., 'lf X is the ultimate end of the 
practice, then it is best for us to do A'). The minor premise of the syllogism simply 
affirms the antecedent (e.g., 'X is the ultimate end of the practice'), and the 
conclusion, the act, is the consequent ( e.g., 'Do act A') (Dependent Rational Animals 
106). 
To help clarify how chains of practical reasoning function, let us look at the 
current plight of professional baseball, in which an economic conflict between players 
and owners intermittently threatens the well-being of the practice at this elite level. In 
their pursuit of greater portions of the wealth and power available through the 
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institution of Major League Baseball, owners and players have been unwilling to 
negotiate mutually beneficial collective bargaining agreements that would improve 
conditions of equal competition within the sport. The issue of equal competition has 
become increasingly important over the last ten years as teams from larger economic 
markets have come to dominate the game by signing many of the best available 
players to contracts that teams from smaller markets cannot afford. However, instead 
of entering into a dialogue about how to help teams from smaller economic markets 
compete with teams from larger markets (e.g., by capping the amount owners can 
spend on their teams or by increasing revenue sharing between owners), owners and 
players continue to seek advantages that would give them the upper hand in the 
bargaining process. Throughout the last thirty years, both have demonstrated their 
willingness to respectively use lockouts and strikes to interrupt baseball seasons with 
no apparent regard for the sport or its fans. In short, it appears that these two factions 
care more about their own individual interests and the wealth they can secure through 
the sport of baseball than they do about the practice of baseball at the elite level. 
In the above case, the athletes and owners of Major League Baseball tend to 
utilize the type of reasoning MacIntyre attributes to the liberal individualist tradition 
of practical reasoning. Using this form of instrumental reasoning, members of both 
groups deduce which actions are best for them according to their personal interests. In 
this instance, their desire for wealth guides them to make decisions that secure for 
them the greatest shares of wealth and power possible, without requiring them to 
consider whether other goods, including the good of fair competition, should be 
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accounted for in their reasoning. To put this in Maclntyrean terms, these individuals' 
preferences for the external goods acquired and distributed through the institution of 
Major League Baseball prompt them to forsake the best interests of the practice of 
baseball in pursuit of the wealth and power that have accompanied the sport's 
increased popularity. 
If, however, these individual owners and players were to suddenly recognize 
that their greed was corrupting baseball and sought different ways of reasoning that 
would allow them to better care for their sport, they would find MacIntyre' s form of 
Aristotelian practical reasoning to be a strong candidate for the job. By adopting this 
tradition of reasoning, owners and players would begin to reason not from their 
individual interests, but from the interests of the practice of baseball. Hence, their 
focus would shift from the external goods available through baseball to the internal 
challenges, standards of excellence and traditions that make the game a unique and 
culturally meaningful form of athletic competition. More specifically, players and 
owners would seek the shared good of equal competition over the individual goods of 
wealth and power, and would reason from the former in an effort to improve 
conditions of fairness within the sport. 
What becomes apparent in the above scenario is the important role that virtues 
play in Aristotelian practical reasoning. Like rationality, MacIntyre defines virtues in 
terms of social practices : 
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of 
which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to 
practices and the lack of which prevents us from achieving any such 
goods (After Virtue 19 1 ). 
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Accordingly, if members of a sporting community do not exercise the virtues 
necessary for the achievement of the common internal goods of the practice, they 
would not be able to attain those shared goods. Returning to the previous example, for 
instance, the players and owners of Major League Baseball have been preoccupied 
with economic matters to the point that they have failed to adequately address the 
inequalities that have developed between small and large market teams. Both sides 
have thus far ignored or forgotten the importance of fairness within the sport. By 
shelving self-interest and moving to solve inequalities in the name of justice, these 
groups of individuals would be working together toward the internal good of fair 
competition-a good that is essential for the achievement of other internal goods 
within the sport. Without fair and equal competition, the attainment of wins, 
championships and records is an illusory and, at best, self-serving exercise. To be 
meaningful, these standards of excellence of baseball must be accomplished under 
conditions of equal competition. Hence, by acting from the virtue of fairness, owners 
and players can help to facilitate more equal on- and off-field competitions between 
teams and, in doing so, improve the moral conditions of baseball and keep it from 
becoming a mere vehicle for economic gain. 
MacIntyre contends that the virtues of a practice also provide community 
members with strong reasons for action within the practice. He claims that any acts 
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endorsed by a virtue or virtues of a practice are acts that, in the eyes of the community, 
are intrinsically good: 
at the level of practice we need no reason for some particular action 
over and above that it is in this situation what one or more of the virtues 
requires. The acts required by the virtues are each of them worth 
performing for their own sake. They are indeed always also a means to 
something further, just because they are constitutive parts of human 
flourishing. But it is precisely as acts worth performing for their own 
sake that they are such parts (Dependent Rational Animals 1 1 1-12). 
To sum up, it is the shared internal goods of excellence of the practice and the 
virtues that facilitate their attainment that are the primary links in Maclntyrean chains 
of practical reasoning. The shared internal goods are the common goods of excellence 
recognized by the practice community, and, as such, are its teloi or ultimate ends. The 
virtues are characteristics that help individuals cultivate and maintain the networks of 
associations that are practices. Therefore, in order to reproduce a chain of practical 
reasoning that identify how community members should act under certain 
circumstances, members must know what the virtues and shared internal goods of the 
practice are. 
We have seen how apprentices can begin to develop accounts of the rationality 
of actions within their practices. Now it is important to examine the process by which 
these new community members come to question the soundness of the prevailing 
reasoning. In the course of learning how to act rationally within specific practices, 
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apprentices also become acquainted with the deliberative framework through which 
community members hear grievances and make decisions concerning the morality and 
rationality of actions within the practice. Actions themselves, however, are not the 
only elements of practical reasoning they question through this framework. 
Community members also deliberate about whether the agreed upon common goods of 
the community are the best ends for the practice, and whether the cultivation of certain 
virtues would direct members to act in the best interests of the practice. We have 
noted that deliberation about the shared standards and internal goods of sports is 
essential because these standards and goods constitute the very foundation upon which 
communities base their reasoning about the practice. Hence, if these shared goods and 
standards are not the best ones for a particular sporting community to pursue, the 
actions deduced from them by its members would not be in the best interests of that 
practice. Similarly, the virtues cultivated by members of a sporting community must 
be examined to ensure that they too are directing members to the actions that are best 
for the practice and, thus, facilitating the achievement of its ultimate ends. 
Returning once again to our baseball example, we can imagine a scenario in 
which owners and players come to realize that their pursuit of wealth through the sport 
is undercutting it insofar as that pursuit is producing vast economic and competitive 
inequalities between small and large market teams. Having recognized this problem, 
the two groups put aside their differences to meet and discuss the best way to rectify 
the situation. In deliberations, the need to de-emphasize individual interests and re­
emphasize equal competition becomes clear. In seeking equal competition, the owners 
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and players also realize the need to cultivate the virtue of fairness over those of 
efficiency and self-interest. From the internal good of equal competition and the 
virtue of fairness, these groups work to arrive at the best way to dissolve the 
inequalities between teams in small and large markets. In such a manner, owners and 
players could, at least in theory, come to an agreement about how to alter the ends 
from which they reason and how to reprioritize their virtues to best eliminate 
inequalities within Major League Baseball and improve the moral condition of both 
the sport and its practice community. 
This example demonstrates how a Maclntyrean deliberative framework can 
help sport practice communities maintain or reestablish the moral integrity of their 
sports. When questionable actions are used by athletes, coaches, owners or 
organizers, a sporting community must have some rational process by which to 
examine these actions. This process should include an examination of the chains of 
reasoning presented by those in favor of the questionable actions and by those opposed 
to them in relation to the agreed upon internal goods and virtues of the practice, as 
well as, if necessary, a r�examination of these goods and virtues. The outcomes of 
this investigation would determine the rationality and morality of the actions within 
the practice. 
Is an action necessarily rational or moral if it is accepted by the members of a 
practice community? If MacIntyre were to answer this question affirmatively, he 
would essentially be immunizing the practical reasoning and the shared internal goods 
and virtues of communities from potential criticisms in much the same way that 
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D' Agostino immunizes the customs and conventions of sport and Gebauer and 
Roberts respectively immunize the advantage-seeking actions and unique individual 
actions from criticism. Such inoculations amount to the acceptance of a version of 
ethical relativism that would prevent the members of sport practice communities from 
protecting their sports from corruptive influences. To escape the fate of 
conventionalist and anti-formalist views, the Maclntyrean theory of sport must not 
place the reasoning or the reasoned actions of communities beyond criticism, and must 
stress the willingness to reexamine them in light of problems that arise within a 
sporting practice. 
MacIntyre himself recognizes the need for continued vigilance on the part of 
practice community members with regard to their practical reasoning and the shared 
internal goods and virtues of the practice. He contends that if a practice community is 
to maintain sound standards of rationality and morality, its members must do more 
than establish a strong deliberative framework through which grievances can be 
presented and debated. For it is only through the willingness to use such a 
framework-through a willingness to question the shared internal goods, virtues, and 
actions of their practice--and a sincere monitoring of the deliberative process itself, 
that community members, as independent practical reasoners, can identify 
inadequacies and inconsistencies within their practical reasoning and, through further 
deliberations, eliminate them (Politics 25 1 ). Such vigilance is displayed by the 
players and owners in our hypothetical baseball scenario. Having recognized the 
inequalities that their instrumental reasoning has established within Major League 
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Baseball, these groups resolve together to place fairness and equal competition before 
salaries and profits in their reasoning. Further vigilance would be necessary to assure 
that players and owners continue to reason in the best interests of the sport by 
emphasizing fair competition between teams in the future, while simultaneously 
working to ensure its financial health for the long run. These community members 
must work together to emphasize the conditions of equal competition that give the 
challenges and standards of baseball meaning, and keep them from becoming hollow 
in the wake of the corruption that can enter the sport. 
In recognizing the importance of a continuing process of reevaluation, 
MacIntyre also recognizes the valuable role that knowledgeable dissenters can play in 
the deliberative process. It is dissenters who, through their criticisms of the sport, 
reveal its problems to members of the community. For this reason, the members of a 
practice community cannot ignore the grievances brought forth against their reasoning 
by other knowledgeable individuals. As in our example, it is necessary for members 
to consider such objections and to be open to the possibility that their accepted chains 
or reasoning might be flawed. Thus, MacIntyre concludes that: 
It will therefore be crucial not only to tolerate dissent, but to enter into 
rational conversation with it and to cultivate as a political virtue not 
merely a passive tolerance, but an active and enquiring attitude towards 
radically dissenting views, a virtue notably absent from the dominant 
politics of the present (Politics 25 1 ). 
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To sum up, I have presented Maclntyre's form of Aristotelian practical 
reasoning as an alternative to the instrumental form of reasoning that dominates elite 
sport today. This type of practical reasoning emphasizes the importance of the 
internal goods, standards of excellence and traditions that make a sporting practice 
unique. It does so by requiring community members to deduce the actions that will be 
accepted as moral or rational within their practice from the ultimate ends of that 
practice. A Maclntyrean theory of sport places the internal goods of excellence of a 
sport ahead of the external goods of wealth, power and status that sporting institutions 
are primarily concerned with acquiring, thus changing the focus of community 
members from economic and political gain to the improvement of their sport as a 
unique and meaningful moral and rational practice. As these goods and the virtues 
that are vital for their attainment are passed down to the apprentices within a sport, 
these new members become acquainted with the reasoning accepted within their 
chosen practice and, through a transformation of their individual interests, make the 
goods, virtues and reasoning of the practice their own. When they have come to 
understand their sport well, these apprentices would hopefully begin to develop the 
skills of independent practical reasoners-skills that would, according to MacIntyre, 
aid them in their vigilant reexaminations of the shared internal goods and virtues of 
the practice and the actions deduced from them. These skills would not only aid them 
in critiquing their community's reasoning, but would help them to recognize salient 
challenges of the status quo leveled by knowledgeable dissenters. Through 
deliberations with other independent reasoners within the practice, the practical 
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reasoning _of the community could thus be maintained or adjusted, and the moral 
integrity of the sport preserved or reestablished. 
The Maclntyrean account of sport, therefore, appears to provide us with the 
solid normative framework other theories of sport have been lacking. The account 
meets each of the criteria of normative strength set out in chapter two. By providing a 
public space in which the members of sporting communities can discuss the goods, 
values, actions and reasoning of the sport, the Maclntyrean account gives members a 
venue for deliberations concerning the welfare of their sport. As a teleological theory, 
the theory focuses community members on their sport's ultimate ends-the shared 
internal goods of excellence that make the sport a unique form of social practice. 
These agreed-upon challenges, standards of excellence and traditions in turn help 
community members determine the virtues they should cultivate and the actions they 
should choose if they are to act in their sport's best interests. With the internal goods 
and virtues of their sport secured, members would not only be able to work out what to 
do in a given situation, they would be capable of examining their reasoning for 
inconsistencies and inadequacies that may have been accepted within the practice over 
the years. Moreover, they would be able to recognize sound challenges to the status 
quo that reveal moral or rational problems within the reasoning of the community. 
Finally, the shared goods and values of the practice would assist community members 
by guiding them through the process of altering rules, conventions and policies, so that 
any changes would serve to preserve or reestablish their sport's moral integrity while 
maintaining or reestablishing those elements that make the sport unique. 
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As presented, the Maclntyrean theory of sport does meet the established 
criteria of nonnative strength. But is it rational for the members of elite sport practice 
communities to prefer this kind of nonnative theory to other such theories of sport? 
Would elite sporting practices and communities be better off if administrators, owners, 
coaches and athletes utilized a Maclntyrean approach to their sport rather than a 
fonnalist, conventionalist or anti-formalist approach? In the final chapter, I closely 
examine the normative value of the Maclntyrean view in relation to these three views 
to demonstrate how the former can assist the members of elite sporting communities in 
solving rational and moral problems within their sport in ways that the latter views 
cannot. In this demonstration, I further establish the validity of the claim that elite 
sporting communities must become communities of inquiry if they are to protect their 
sports from corruptive influences and preserve their uniqueness as sporting practices. 
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Chapter V 
Elite Sporting Practice Communities as Communities of Inquiry 
Elite sporting practices face a variety of threats to their moral and rational 
integrity. As caretakers of a particular sport, it is the responsibility of administrators, 
owners, coaches and athletes to recognize the problems that arise within their sport 
and to devise solutions that improve that sport's nonnative conditions. If this is so, 
what kind of account of sport would best assist these caretakers in their efforts? 
Which type of theory would best guide them through the process of deciding which 
actions could help their sport flourish as a social practice? 
In this chapter, I will offer two examples from the context of elite sport to 
demonstrate that the Maclntyrean account of sport is normatively superior to the 
accounts given by formalism, conventionalism and anti-formalism. Through this 
demonstration, I intend to show that the primary strength of the Maclntyrean view is 
its requirement that sport practice communities become communities of inquiry-that 
members of these communities come together to discuss and recognize the ultimate 
ends (teloi) and shared goods of the practice and to establish the virtues and actions 
that best facilitate their achievement. It is as reflective communities_ that these 
members can best protect their sports from corruption and preserve them as unique 
forms of athletic competition. Put another way, it is as communities of inquiry that 
sport practice communities are capable of both recognizing and acting for "the good of 
the game." 
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The Casey Martin Case 
On May twenty-ninth, 200 1 ,  the United States Supreme Court ruled seven to 
two that disabled golfer Casey Martin could use a golf cart in events sanctioned by the 
Professional Golf Association (PGA). Martin suffers from Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber 
Syndrome, a circulatory disorder that makes it painful and risky for him to walk the 
length of a golf course. He originally sued the PGA Tour in 1997 under the 
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), which requires that "reasonable 
modifications" be made to allow disabled individuals access to "public 
accommodations" when these do not "fundamentally alter the nature" of the activity in 
question (Greenhouse Al). In its appeal of a lower court's decision, the Tour 
contended that walking the course was an integral part of PGA golf, since it added a 
substantial endurance factor to the sport. The PGA contended that Martin would gain 
an unfair advantage over walking pros by riding in a cart, and that this would throw 
the conditions of equal competition out of balance. 
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with this assessment, siding instead 
with the trial court's decision which contended that, because Martin must walk a mile 
or more from cart to ball and back with his disability, he experiences a level of fatigue 
similar to that of walking professionals (Greenhouse D4). Justice John Paul Stevens 
further noted in the majority opinion that "[f]rom early on, the essence of the game [of 
golf] has been shot making," that the walking rule instituted by the PGA was "at best 
peripheral," and that walking was "not an indispensable feature" of the sport at any 
level ( Greenhouse A 1 ) . 
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JU:stice Antonin Scalia, who wrote the minority decision, disagreed not only 
with the logic of the majority decision, but with the sentiment in which it appeared to 
be based. Scalia argued that the Supreme Court should not have taken it upon itself to 
attempt to answer the "incredibly difficult and incredibly silly question" of "What Is 
Golf' (Greenhouse D4). He essentially argued that the PGA's rules and its right to 
make them should not be undermined, and that the decision would lead down a 
slippery slope to a point where "[t]aimess and the ADA mean that everyone gets to 
play by individualized rules which will assure that no one's lack of ability . . .  will be a 
handicap" (Ruibal C3 ). He claimed, for example, that the parents of Little Leaguers 
with Attention Deficit Disorder might use such a ruling to have their child granted a 
fourth strike in allowance for the disorder's effects on his or her play" (Buskupic and 
Blauvelt A2). He further contended that the majority had acted with "a benevolent 
compassion that the law does not place it within [the Court's] power to impose" 
( Greenhouse D4 ). 
Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice Scalia on these points. He contended 
that the ruling would not force sports organizations in general and the PGA Tour 
specifically to alter conditions of equal competition in making accommodations for 
athletes with disabilities (Buskupic & Blauvelt A2). Stevens claimed that sports 
organizations should "carefully weigh the purpose, as well as the letter of the rule 
before determining that no accommodation would be tolerable," to make sure that 
athletes with disabilities would be given opportunities to participate when such 
allowances did not fundamentally alter the conditions of fairness within the sport 
109 
(Ruibal C3 ). He further pointed out that the Martin case was a special one due to the 
degree of his disability and his ability as a shot maker, stating that his case thus 
"differs from one that might be asserted by players with less serious afflictions that 
make walking the course uncomfortable or difficult, but not beyond their capacity" 
(Chambers spl3). Such temporary and less serious problems are not covered under 
the ADA and could not be used to gain an exception from the PGA' s walking rule 
(Chambers sp 13). 
Reactions within the PGA Tour were mixed with regard to the ruling. PGA 
Tour Commissioner Tom Fincham believed that, even though the ruling was particular 
to the Martin case, "the issues involved go well beyond considerations involving an 
individual player" ("One Issue, Many Views" D4 ). Fincham and others within the 
PGA were concerned that other golfers with lesser temporary or permanent disabilities 
would seek exemption from the walking rule they believe to be an "integral part" of 
PGA golf Since back problems plague many on the tour, for instance, some feared 
players would use the Martin ruling to obtain carts for their ailments in an attempt to 
gain some advantage over their walking opponents (Brown D4 ). The ruling thus left 
many with questions regarding the status of the walking rule._ Tour professional Stuart 
Appleby expressed concern in this area, saying "I'd like to know where this leaves us. 
We've got to make it clearer and clearer what the rules are" (Brown D4). Hal Sutton, 
another frustrated pro, exclaimed "We're in a real gray area now," and asked "Who's 
the governing body of the door that [the Supreme Court] opened?" ("One Issue, Many 
Views" D4 ). 
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T�e concerns these individuals and others voiced regarding the ruling stemmed 
from their lament of having the rules of their sport dictated to them by an outside 
agency. To be sure, the Supreme Court did usurp the PGA's power to set its own rules 
in this case. It did so, however, while acting as a mediator between Martin and the 
advocates of the ADA on the one hand, and the PGA and other sport organizations 
who feared losing the privilege of self-government on the other. As MacIntyre points 
out, the Court has often carried out such a role in disputes between groups with 
different conceptions of justice: 
One function of the Supreme Court must be to keep the peace between 
rival social groups adhering to rival and incompatible principles of 
justice by displaying a fairness which consists in even-handedness in its 
adjudications [ . . .  The Court has often] played the role of a 
peacekeeping or truce-keeping body by negotiating its way through an 
impasse of conflict, not by invoking our shared moral first principles, 
for our society as a whole has none (After Virtue 253). 
The Supreme Court acted in this manner in the Martin case. It countered the 
PGA' s claim that walking is an integral part of golf, but limited the scope of the ruling 
so that it applied only to Martin and to those in similar circumstances. Although the 
Supreme Court did overrule the PGA in this case, Roy L. Reardon, one of Martin's 
lawyers, contends that the Court's intervention and the lawsuit that invited it could 
have been avoided entirely if Fincham and those responsible for the PGA' s rules had 
recognized the unique nature of the case and granted Martin an exemption when he 
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first requested one in 1997. Reardon claims that Fincham "could have made this a 
win-win situation a long time ago ifhe wanted to, by simply agreeing to give Casey a 
pass" (Brown D4). By refusing to do so, Fincham ultimately put the decision in the 
hands of an external body (the Supreme Court) rather than putting forth greater effort 
to resolve the issue from within the PGA. Might there have been another way for 
Fincham and PGA officials and players to resolve this situation? How might they, as 
a practice community, have used the internal goods and standards of excellence of the 
sport of golf and the values that facilitate their achievement, to reason out this 
dilemma? 
On the Maclntyrean view of sport, the playing professionals and officials of 
the PGA are the caretakers of the sport at the elite level. As such, it is their 
responsibility to examine the rules and regulations of the sport and their rationale 
when disagreements arise concerning them. Hence, when Casey Martin requested a 
special exemption to the PGA Tour's walking rule, it was, according to Maclntyrean 
theory, the responsibility of the officials and professionals of the PGA to assess the 
infonnation regarding the extent of Martin's disability to detennine whether his 
condition warranted special consideration. In making this decision, the Maclntyrean 
view would require these individuals to come together as a community of inquiry to 
discuss whether or not walking should be viewed as one of the shared internal goods 
of golf In order to answer this question well, however, the PGA community would 
first have to establish what the telos or ultimate end of golf is . It was precisely this 
task that Justice Scalia believed the Supreme Court should not carry out in the Martin 
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case, and with good reason. For the establishment of the telos of the sport should have 
been the result of thorough discussions amongst the professionals and officials of the 
PGA; discussions that should have accounted for the primary challenges, standards of 
excellence and historical precedents and traditions of the sport, all of which play an 
important part in making golf the sport it is. Instead, the decision on the telos was 
made for the PGA by the Supreme Court majority, who singled out shot-making as the 
ultimate end of golf. 
Since the PGA had already weighed in on this issue, what gave the Supreme 
Court the right to overrule its decision that walking is an important part of the sport? 
In its role as mediator, the Court chose to name the telos of golf shot-making, and, in 
doing so, opened up the possibility of using the ADA to keep Casey Martin from 
being discriminated against. In its ruling, the Supreme Court carried out what 
MacIntyre refers to as the three functions of law (After Virtue 255): They dealt with 
the above perceived injustice, defended Martin's freedom to pursue a career in a sport 
in which he excels, and extended generosity to him as a disabled individual who 
requires some assistance in the pursuit of his goal. 
Was the Supreme Court correct in proclaiming that shot-making is the telos of 
golf? There are several reasons for believing that it was. First, it is the elements of 
shot-making that make golf a unique form of activity. As a target sport played over a 
large area, golf requires athletes to hit accurate shots from a variety of distances. To 
accomplish this task, players choose from a variety of clubs manufactured to allow 
them to hit the ball certain distances at certain heights. For example, a 3-iron is 
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designed to hit long, low shots, whereas a 9-iron is made to hit short, high shots. The 
speed and path of the golfer's swing also help to determine the distance and height of 
a shot as well as the plane on which the ball travels and the accuracy of the shot. To • 
make matters even more difficult, golfers must play the ball from where it lies on the 
course. This means they must learn to hit shots from a variety of different lies, 
including from the high grass of the rough and the sand of the bunker. All of the 
above elements come together to make the game of golf a special type of sport; one in 
which participants must hit the ball to a target-the hole-with as few strokes as 
possible, using clubs made to particular specifications and their own swings and 
creativity. 
The challenges of shot-making are carefully set out by the constitutive rules of 
golf. These rules establish the means that players may use to meet what Suits refers to 
as the "pre-lusory goar'' of the sport (Grasshopper 36-37). They tell players how they 
may accomplish the task of getting the ball into the hole. The constitutive rules set 
specifications for the clubs players may use, and state that players must "play the ball 
where it lies." They also state the conditions under which players may move objects 
that impede their shots or drop their ball away from more permanent, human-made 
obstructions without penalty, as well as the conditions under which players will be 
penalized ( e.g., when they lose balls or hit them out-of-bounds). By prescribing the 
manner in which players may achieve the pre-lusory goal of golf, the constitutive rules 
establish not only the skills, strategies and challenges that make up the sport, but the 
set of conditions under which golfers must play if their results are to be meaningfully 
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compared_ with the accomplishments of those who came before them or against whom 
they currently play. 
In Maclntyrean terms, these rules set up many of the shared internal goods and 
standards of excellence of the sport of golf. The internal goods include such things as 
hitting a good shot from a difficult lie in the rough or a bunker, hitting a ball on a 
plane that carries it around an obstacle to a safe landing spot, or sinking a putt on an 
undulating green. The ability to hit such shots by design is a talent that golfers and 
knowledgeable spectators alike respect and enjoy. The ability to hit good shots 
consistently enough to make or break par on an eighteen-hole course or to win a four­
day tournament are also internal goods that the members of the golfing community can 
appreciate. 
Par itself is a standard of excellence that is understood and respected by those 
who play the game. It represents the number of strokes it should take a good golfer to 
complete a hole or course, and is determined by the distance and difficulty of the hole 
or holes that make up the course. Achieving or breaking par over eighteen holes or 
over the four rounds of a tournament is a display not only of consistency, but of 
mental focus and physical stamina. This achievement is sought after by golfers 
around the world. Only the best golfers attain this goal consistently enough to become 
PGA and LPGA (Ladies Professional Golf Association) professionals and regularly 
challenge strong competitors in tournaments sanctioned by these governing bodies. 
Those who struggle to make good shots marvel at the abilities of individuals that are 
able to meet these standards of excellence and play the game of golf at its highest 
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level. It is in their accomplishments that we discover how the sport can be played 
when the art and science of shot-making is mastered. 
In meeting the challenges and achieving the standards of excellence of golf or 
any other sport, athletes must follow the rules if their accomplishments are to be more 
than self-serving. In golf, it is the conditions of equal competition set forth by the 
rules that allow us to compare the scores of competitors over a particular round or 
tournament and determine a winner. To the extent that other factors ( e.g. , equipment 
technology, course difficulty, etc.) are similar, it also allows us to compare a golfer's 
performance to performances from the recent past. Due to the different socio­
historical factors that have affected golf during different periods, we should not 
attempt to make exact comparisons between golfers who play decades apart. We 
should not, for example, attempt to compare the efforts of players using today's 
technologized clubs and balls to the performances of those who used wooden-shafted 
clubs and less resilient balls on the same course in the past, because the latter group 
would be playing a different type of golf than the former; a type that requires longer 
approach shots into the green rather than the shorter shots today's players have left 
after their technology-assisted drives. 
Since conditions of equal competition play such an important role in relation to 
the standards of excellence and shared internal goods of the sport, one could argue that 
they themselves represent a shared internal good of golf. This set of conditions is a 
good that makes the attainment of the other internal goods related to shot-making both 
possible and meaningful. It also displays for us the important role that the virtue of 
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fairness plays both in golf and within sports in general. Gamewrights and governing 
bodies must act from fairness in establishing and altering the rules of sports if they are 
to create or maintain conditions of equal competition. If they do not properly assess 
these conditions or the existing threats to them, they risk the possibility of rendering 
contests meaningless by unfairly granting unearned advantages to competitors within 
them. 
Having established the te/os and shared internal goods of golf and the 
importance that the conditions of equal competition and the virtue of fairness have for 
them, it is appropriate to ask whether and how walking could be considered an internal 
good of PGA golf. In its favor, walking is a traditional part of the game in general and 
of PGA golf in particular. Walking has been a part of the conditions of play since the 
sport began. It is, therefore, an element of the sport that, until recently, golfers across 
the ages have shared as part of their experiences. For the average player, walking 
preserves the leisurely pace of the activity and the condition of the fairways, which 
may be tom up by careless cart drivers. For professional and amateur competitors, 
walking adds an endurance factor to the sport that affects their shot-making abilities in 
the later holes of rounds and the later rounds of tournaments. Golfing masters from 
Bobby Jones to Ben Hogan to Jack Nicklaus to Tiger Woods have walked courses in 
winning tournaments and setting the standards by which the best golfers in the world 
measure themselves. 
The above reasons indicate that walking is an important historical link for 
golfers who have played throughout the ages and, as a factor affecting the shot making 
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abilities of players, is also part of the conditions of equal competition. On the 
Maclntyrean view, then, it would seem that walking could be considered a shared 
internal good of golf insofar as it is a traditional part of the practice that is PGA golf 
and part of the conditions that affect fairness within the sport. It cannot, however, be 
considered part of the telos of golf because it is only contingently related to the 
primary activity of the sport: shot-making. While fatigue from walking can 
detrimentally affect the shot making abilities of players, especially in tournaments 
played in extreme heat, it is not an essential element of golf as a sport. We can 
observe this fact at any local golf course where, on a regular basis, tournaments are 
held in which participants ride in carts and no one questions whether they are playing 
golf or not. We might also note that golfers turning in scorecards that are used to 
compute their handicaps are neither required to walk nor asked whether they walked 
the course or rode in a cart. Even the PGA views the use of carts as acceptable in its 
Senior Tour and qualifying school events. Reardon believes that it is this lack of 
consistency concerning the use of carts that contributed to the Supreme Court's 
decision to allow Martin to ride in PGA Tour events (Brown D4). From the above 
points, then, it appears that walking is not a necessary element of the sport of golf and, 
hence, is not a part of the sport's te/os. 
Having established that walking is a contingent part of golf, the question arises 
as to whether there are conditions under which the PGA should grant an exemption to 
its walking rule. In Maclntyrean terms, one might ask if there are situations in which 
PGA officials and professionals should not view walking as one of their sport's 
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internal goods. The answer to this question can be pieced together from what has 
already been said about walking and the sport of golf. If walking can be considered an 
internal good of golf only insofar as it is traditionally part of the game and it affects 
the sport's conditions of fairness, then it would be permissible to allow Casey Martin 
or a golfer with a similar disability to ride in a cart if the endurance requirements for 
the golfer in question were the same or similar to those for walking professionals. For, 
if the riding and walking golfers experience similar levels of fatigue, the former would 
gain no appreciable advantage over the latter and the conditions of equal competition 
would not be compromised. 
Are there circumstances in which a riding golfer will experience fatigue similar 
to that experienced by a walking golfer? If such a situation has ever existed, it would 
be that of Casey Martin. Martin's case is truly exceptional. Even though he suffers 
from a disease that keeps him from walking eighteen holes, he has the capacity to be a 
strong shot maker who, when his condition and court cases are not troubling him, has 
played PGA-caliber golf. Many look at Martin's capabilities as a shot maker and 
think that he would gain a significant advantage over professionals who walk if he is 
given a cart. What these individuals fail to realize is that Martin is not playing under 
the same conditions as his colleagues. He is playing with a diseased right leg that 
makes it painful for him even to walk from cart to ball and back, something he must 
do for nearly every shot he takes during a round. As Sports Illustrated columnist Rick 
Reilly points out, the cart only helps him when he is in it. It does not stop the pain he 
feels when hitting balls off uphill or sidehill lies; it does not help him when he is in too 
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much pain to practice; and it does not help him to sleep when the pain keeps him up at 
night (Reilly 102). Still, the seriousness of this condition and the severity of the pain 
that accompanies it seem to be underestimated by PGA members and officials alike. 
In a Golf Digest interview, Martin noted that 
[a] common perception toward people with disabilities is that you're 
going to have an advantage, and that's just a gross distortion of the 
truth. I'm sure a lot of players would love to take a cart, but I 
guarantee you they would not like to take a cart with my leg ( qtd. in 
Anderson D 1 ). 
Martin's comments speak to the fact that many are unaware of what it is like 
for him to compete at his sport with his disability. Some go so far as to call him a 
cheater-someone who uses a physical condition to gain an unfair advantage over his 
peers. What such individuals fail to recognize is that the amount of fatigue Martin 
experiences due to his condition is comparable to and may exceed that experienced by 
a walking professional. The trial court's and Supreme Court's decisions recognized 
this, noting that his mile of walking from and to the cart taxes him to a greater extent 
than others might believe (Greenhouse D4). If this is indeed true, then it would 
appear that Martin could ride in a cart without gaining any significant advantage over 
his peers. 
Those who would call Martin a cheater further forget that not all conditions of 
competition must be equalized in order for a fair contest to take place. Professionals 
on the PGA and LPGA Tours use different brands of equipment that theoretically give 
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some a technological advantage over others. Some golfers play in fewer tournaments 
than others and arrange their playing schedules so they will be fresher for the major 
tournaments of the Tours. And pros who walk the course with chronic back problems 
certainly seem to be at a disadvantage in relation to healthier competitors. The PGA 
accepts these and other inequalities within its brand of golf. Why, then, should it not 
exempt a disabled golfer, who is under conditions of fatigue similar to those faced by 
other competitors, from its walking rule? In granting this exemption, the PGA would 
be treating Martin equitably without favoring him; it would be treating him according 
to his needs in a manner that neither alters the te/os of the sport (i.e. shot-making) nor 
gives him any appreciable advantage over other competitors. It appears then that the 
PGA could, as the Supreme Court ruled, allow Casey Martin to ride in a cart in its 
Tour events without affecting the conditions of fairness of those tournaments or 
rendering his efforts meaningless in relation to the standards of excellence of the sport. 
To put it in Maclntyrean terms, the PGA should grant Martin an exemption to the 
walking rule because this would not alter the telos or shared internal goods of the sport 
and would violate neither the virtue of fairness nor the internal good of fair 
competition. 
According to the Maclntyrean view of sport, the PGA community has failed as 
a reflective community in this case. Officials and professionals were primarily 
concerned with the rules of the sport, even though the rule at stake was one that could 
have been sacrificed in this case for a greater good. This good was carried out by the 
Supreme Court, who utilized the ADA to stop the PGA from discriminating against 
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Martin and to allow him access to the elite level of his sport. The Court also implicitly 
recognized in its decision that PGA officials had failed to uphold their responsibility to 
make the shared internal goods and scarce external goods accessible to Martin and 
others who, like him, are capable shot makers but cannot walk the course due to 
disabilities. The validity of this claim was witnessed by USA Today columnist Joe 
Saraceno, who stated that 
[t]he Martin decision is correct because it reinforces the rights of those 
whose voices would be muted by an elite majority. That is why we 
have the Americans With Disabilities Act to protect people from 
institutionalized customs that unfairly bar the disabled (3C). 
What PGA officials failed to assess was whether, by not granting an exemption 
to the traditional walking rule, they were unreasonably denying Martin access to the 
highest level of his sport and to the prestige and prize money available at that level. 
These officials were so concerned with the issues of competitive fairness and of 
· tradition that they did not glance beyond them to see the flaws in their practical 
reasoning. This ultimately set the scene for the Supreme Court to enter into the 
dispute as a peacekeeping agent, using the ADA to correct the perceived injustices 
experienced by Martin while, as best as possible, limiting the effects of the ruling to 
his particular case. 
In its decision, the Supreme Court also implicitly recognized virtues other than 
fairness that the PGA chose not to. Had they been accounted for, these virtues would 
have helped PGA officials and professionals to eliminate flaws within their moral 
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reasonmg._ What virtues other than fairness need to be considered in this case? In 
Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre reminds us that besides "virtues of 
independence"-those virtues like honesty, justice and courage that make it possible 
for us to become independent practical reasoners within a community-there are other 
virtues without which we would be incapable of fully understanding the "relationships 
of giving and receiving through which our ends as practical reasoners are to be 
achieved'' ( 120). MacIntyre calls this second set of virtues the ''virtues of 
acknowledged dependence" ( 120). These virtues are somewhat difficult to identify. 
MacIntyre claims that the primary virtue in question is a hybrid of justice and 
generosity that is not captured within contemporary English language. This virtue is a 
form of generosity that the members of a particular group owe one another. Should a 
member fail to extend this owed generosity to another member, he or she would be 
committing an injustice within the group. The virtue of "just generosity," which is 
recognized in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and within the culture of the Lakota, 
thus requires members "to act from and with a certain kind of affectionate regard" 
toward others whom we recognize as being in need of such regard · (Dependent 
Rational Animals 120-22). MacIntyre includes disabled individuals, who often need 
help in carving a niche for themselves and in developing their own potential, as 
individuals who are owed such. He states that 
[ d]ifferent individuals, disabled in different ways and degrees, can have 
their own peculiar talents and possibilities, and their own difficulties. 
Each therefore needs others to take note of his or her particular 
condition" (Dependent Rational Animals 73 ). 
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In Casey Martin's case, PGA officials and some professionals failed to treat 
him with the "affectionate regard" required by the virtue of just generosity, and, in 
doing so, failed to recognize the virtues of acknowledged dependence in their practical 
reasoning. But does this failure truly reveal a flaw in the practical reasoning of the 
PGA community? Is a sporting community required to take such virtues into account 
in the assessment of its practical reasoning? If we follow MacIntyre' s argument, it is, 
for he recognizes "clubs dedicated to games and sports" as the kinds of associations 
"whose common good is to be served and sustained by the virtues of acknowledged 
dependence" (Dependent Rational Animals 135). It is in relation to such associations 
that MacIntyre asks: 
"What kind of place then are those who are temporarily or permanently 
disabled able to have in such a community? What kind of recognition 
is the recognition required to sustain respect both for them and for 
those not disabled, as well as their self-respect? (Dependent Rational 
Animals 135). 
While it remains a question to what extent elite sporting communities can 
accommodate the needs of disabled athletes without risking the integrity of their 
sporting practices, we have already established that golfs standing as a unique sport is 
not at stake in Martin's case. In this instance, PGA officials simply failed to clearly 
explain what place a disabled golfer has within their community of professionals. And 
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in not clearly explaining this, they failed to account for the importance of the virtue of 
just generosity in this case. As a result, PGA officials and professionals had to endure 
a significant amount of negative press and the further embarrassment of having the 
Supreme Court decide this issue for them. In stating that there was in fact a place for a 
golfer who could not walk on the PGA Tour, Justice Stevens and the majority of 
Supreme Court Justices specifically recognized what MacIntyre has stated generally: 
That 
We discover [ . . .  ] in our encounters with the disabled hitherto 
unrecognized sources of error in our own practical reasoning. And 
insofar as these derived from the hitherto dominant norms of our social 
environment, we will have to transform that environment as well as 
ourselves, if we are to be freed from such errors in our shared 
deliberative reasoning (Dependent Rational Animals 1 37). 
While the Maclntyrean theory of sport has greatly assisted us in our 
examination of the Casey Martin case and in answering the difficult questions that 
arise within it, we must still ask whether any of the theories we examined in chapter 
two could be equally as helpful. It is cases like this one, however, that reveal the 
normative weaknesses of formalist, conventionalist and anti-formalist theories of 
sport. Since formalist theories emphasize the primacy of the rules of sport, they would 
be of little help to the PGA community in determining whether an exemption to those 
rules would be in order. Similarly, because conventionalist theories would emphasize 
the importance of walking as a traditional element of golf, they would tend to 
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immunize it from compromise and, hence, would be unable to offer us any guidance 
concerning the conditions under which an exemption to the walking rule might be 
acceptable. Both conventionalism and formalism would be better able to help PGA 
community members if they simply placed the onus of proof upon those requesting the 
exemption in this case. However, these theories go further than this, privileging 
tradition and formal rules respectively to the point that they present us with no clear 
conditions under which it is permissible to alter them, thus rendering themselves 
useless to those seeking such conditions. 
In contrast, the Maclntyrean theory of sport does help us to work out the 
conditions under which an exemption to the walking rule would be permissible. For by 
establishing the te/os of golf as shot-making and its shared internal goods as the goods 
experienced in relation to shot-making, a golfing community can reason that walking 
is only an internal good of the sport insofar as it is part of its tradition and has 
influenced the conditions of fair competition and the manner in which the sport's 
standards of excellence have been set. If someone were to present that community 
with a case in which a riding golfer would compete under endurance conditions 
similar to those of his or her walking colleagues, its members would be capable of 
reasoning that the riding golfer would be competing fairly with those colleagues even 
though he or she was allowed to use a cart. Having worked this out, the community 
could then discuss whether there were good reasons to drop the traditional requirement 
of walking in this instance. Thus we see that by examining challenges to the status 
quo such as requests for rule exemptions, and by clearly establishing what the te/os 
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and inte�l goods of their sport are, a golfing community can utilize the Maclntyrean 
approach to reason out the conditions under which it would be fair and acceptable for 
a rule exemption to be granted. 
Could an anti-formalist theory of sport give us an equally sound answer to this 
problem? Using Roberts' anti-formalist account, PGA professionals and officials 
could conclude that Martin and others like him should be exempt from the walking 
rule. The reasoning behind this decision, however, would be quite different from that 
of the Maclntyrean view in that it would not necessarily have the good of the sport of 
golf in mind. Looking back on Roberts' view, it should be remembered as one in 
which creativity and individuality are valued over rules and traditions. In utilizing this 
theory, the PGA community might condone Martin's use of a cart, but would do so 
only because it was in his best interest and not because it was in the best interest of the 
sport. 
Futhermore, Roberts' approach would advocate the use of carts or other means 
of transport by any golfer who wanted to use them. To be sure, the use of carts by 
individuals with temporary injuries or physical conditions less severe than Martin's is 
a topic worthy of further discussion by the PGA community. The problem here is that 
Roberts' form of anti-formalism presents us with no criteria by which to determine 
who should be allowed to ride in a cart and who should not. In accepting this theory, 
the PGA would not only be accepting individuals' rights to recreate themselves by 
riding carts, but would be endorsing their rights to recreate themselves through other 
legal and illegal actions on the course, including actions related to the primary activity 
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of ball striking. Some of these actions might be good for the game, others might harm 
it, but that is not the concern of strong poet-golfers. They are concerned primarily 
with their own self-creation and not necessarily with the good of golf Such 
individuals thus may place the ultimate end of shot-making and the skills, challenges, 
standards and traditions related to it at risk without considering whether their actions 
are corrupting the sport or its conditions of equal competition in some manner. Thus, 
in accepting Roberts' anti-formalist approach in this situation, the PGA would have to 
accept a number of other individualist actions within the sport that could threaten the 
traditional and formal structures of the sport. 
In endorsing the Maclntyrean approach, on the other hand, the PGA would be 
endorsing a theory that shows respect for the rules and traditions of golf This 
approach bases practical reasoning on the telos of shot-making and its related internal 
goods, and measures the validity of challenges to that reasoning in terms of these and 
the virtues that facilitate their attainment. If actions proposed by individualists are 
found to have negative effects on these elements, they could be rejected by the PGA 
community on the grounds that they were not in the best interests of the sport. It is for 
this reason that the Maclntyrean account of sport is superior to the anti-formalist 
account offered by Roberts; it simply gives us the normative framework to protect the 
sport of golf from potentially harmful actions that Roberts' view does not. 
To sum up, by using a Maclntyrean approach and reprioritizing the values of 
the community to reflect a new understanding of its moral responsibility achieved 
through recognition of the value of just generosity, PGA officials could have reached a 
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decision �t would have allowed Casey Martin to ride a cart in Tour events. Martin, 
whose play suffered greatly over the 3-4 years in which his lawsuit was contested, 
would then have been free to concentrate on his game, and the PGA would have 
avoided the considerable amount of negative press it received during the trials. More 
importantly, by utilizing a Maclntyrean approach, PGA officials and professionals 
could have come together to discuss the internal goods of excellence of their sport and 
to determine how these might be shared with golfers whose physical conditions allow 
them to take part in the primary activity of ball striking, but restrict them from walking 
the course. These disabled golfers, I must reemphasize, would not be receiving 
special treatment that would give them an unacceptable advantage over their fellow 
competitors. In the language of the ADA, the modifications should not "alter the 
fundamental nature of the activity," but should open up competition to certain disabled 
individuals to compete on an equitable, if not equal, basis with their fully-ab led 
colleagues. Thus we see that, through the application of the Maclntyrean theory, a 
sporting community can improve its practical reasoning and the moral standing of its 
sport, while also maintaining the primary rules and challenges that make the sport the 
particular culturally meaningful activity it is. 
The Case of Figure Skating 
Figure skating' s moral integrity and its status as a sport recently came into 
question during the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, Utah. Inquiries 
stemmed from a well publicized judging scandal that served to reemphasize the · 
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problems that figure skating faces as a sport that includes both (a) elements of artistry 
that are subject to personal and cultural biases, and (b) a scoring system that is 
vulnerable to political influences. The scandal, dubbed "Skategate" by the Western 
media, erupted after the Olympic pairs skating competition, in which the Russian team 
of Yelena Berezhnaya and Anton Sikharulidze narrowly defeated the popular 
Canadian pair, Jamie Sale and David Pelletier, for the gold medal. The Canadian pair, 
the crowd and several Western experts disagreed with the final scoring of the event, 
which some interpreted as "a sympathy vote" for the Russians, who had overcome 
many obstacles in becoming one of the elite skating pairs in the world. Although the 
Canadians skated what many agreed was a technically superior program, the Russians 
benefited from higher presentation marks that vaulted them to the top step of the 
medal stand (Roberts, 2/12/02 Al). 
There have been controversial decisions in figure skating competitions 
throughout the history of the Olympics, and this would have been just one more had it 
not been for the rumors of judging improprieties that tenacious Westernjournalists 
refused to let die. In response to the public outcry that followed, the International 
Skating Union (ISU) announced an investigation into the scoring of the pairs 
competition (Roberts, 2/ 1 3/03 Al , D3). The inquiry focused on French judge Marie 
Reine Le Gougne. Officials believed Le Gougne had been pressured to vote for the 
Russians, possibly as part of a deal that would deliver the Russian vote to France's ice 
dancers in the upcoming Olympic competition (Roberts, 2/14/02 D3). Upon 
examining the scoring of the pairs competition, the marks of the French, Russian and 
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Ukranian judges stood out. Each graded the Russians' and Canadians' long programs 
the same, and each gave the pairs equivalent marks for technical merit, even though 
the Russians had visible difficulties with certain elements while the Canadians skated 
flawlessly ("Selection Process" D3). Further suspicions that Cold War political 
alliances were reforming and had influenced the results of the competition arose from 
the fact that, besides the French judge, it was the Russian, Ukranian, Polish and 
Chinese judges that ranked the Russian pair first (Roberts, 2/13/02 Al). 
The above rumors and evidence prompted Canadian Olympic officials to 
appeal the judges' decision in the pairs competition. According to the Olympic 
Charter, it is the ISU's responsibility as the international federation governing figure 
skating to oversee its competitions and settle disputes of this kind should they arise 
(Janofsky C21). Under pressure from the Canadians and the Western media, newly­
elected IOC President Jacques Rogge strongly urged ISU President and IOC member 
Ottavio Cinquanata to resolve the issue expediently (Roberts, 2/14/02 A I). At first, 
Cinquanata appeared impervious to pressure. He stated that a decision concerning the 
appeal would be forthcoming only after a full council meeting of the ISU on Monday, 
February eighteenth, and rejected a proposal to replace LeGougne's scores with those 
of an alternate judge-a move that would have reversed the decision in the pairs 
competition (Roberts, 2/15/02 Al). However, when Rogge and the media continued 
to apply pressure, Cinquanata called an emergency council meeting for late Thursday 
night, February fourteenth, at which it was decided that there was sufficient evidence 
that Le Gougne had been pressured by some party to vote for the Russian pair. As a 
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result, the council decided to suspend Le Gougne, discard her scores from the pairs 
competition, and award duplicate gold medals to the Canadian pair (Roberts, 2/16/02 
Al  & B21). 
The IOC concurred with this decision, much to the dismay of Russian officials, 
who believed that Rogge and Cinquanata had caved to the extreme pressure created by 
the Western media and had set a dangerous precedent of overturning the results of 
judged events. The Russian delegation believed their pair had won the competition 
fairly. They pointed out that the Canadians had fallen at the end of their short 
program, and that the Russian skaters' newly-choreographed program was more 
difficult and artistically superior to the Canadians' program, which was the same one 
they used to win the World Championships nearly a year previous to the 2002 
Olympic Games (Schmemann B20). In the end, however, Russian protests blended 
with a cacophony of others, as the truth of what happened in the judging of the 
Olympic pairs competition became obscured by conflicting reports from judges and 
national and international sports officials. 
The mystery of what happened that night may never be solved, but no 
resolution is necessary for us to glean the knowledge needed to view figure skating 
with a critical eye. The scandal points clearly to the need for reform within the sport. 
Over the years, the objectivity of its judging has been jeopardized by international 
politics and the politics of skating; by cultural and personal judging biases concerning 
the appearance of skaters and the music, costumes and choreography they choose for 
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their programs; and by differences of opinion concerning the weighting of the athletic 
and aesthetic elements that are part of the sport. 
It is this last issue that has become the focal point of skating' s search for 
increased objectivity. Some ISU members, including Cinquanata, believe that the 
current six-point scoring system, in which skaters are graded on technical merit and 
artistic presentation, should be replaced with one that emphasizes the athletic moves of 
skaters and de-emphasizes aesthetic criteria that are susceptible to the subjective 
biases of judges. This group believes that, as athletes, skaters should be judged on 
their abilities to complete jumps, spins and other athletic moves rather than on their 
abilities to artistically impress judges with beauty and graceful movements. Aesthetic 
movement and artistic impression are things that are difficult to quantify; athletic 
jumps and spins may be judged more precisely. Hence, in theory, a scoring system 
that stresses athleticism over artistry should increase objectivity within the judging and 
scoring of the sport. 
Others within the figure skating community disagrees with this reasoning. 
They contend that reforms that reduce the importance of aesthetic movement in the 
name of efficiency and objectivity would damage the sport's identity. These 
individuals believe that, because of figure skating's long tradition as an aesthetic sport, 
its caretakers should not seek to strongly de-emphasize its artistic elements. They 
argue that without these, figure skating would not be the unique and meaningful form 
of athletic competition that it is-a blend of athleticism and artistry that requires 
athletes to do more than land their triple jumps in order to win in competition. 
Journalist Christine Brennan fashioned an argument similar to this against a new 
system of judging presented by Cinquanata during the 2002 Winter Olympics. In 
defense of the sport's artistic heritage, Brennan asked: 
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What happens to the artistry of the sport? What happens to the music? 
And what happens to the very name of the sport? If Cinquanata gets 
his way, this won't be figure skating anymore. It will be ice jumping. 
It will be nothing but jumps and other athletic moves. [ . . .  ] jumps make 
your heart leap, but if figure skating jettisons its beauty, it's just 
another sport, and not a very good one ("Skating Scoring" 3D). 
In Maclntyrean terms, what Brennan is concerned about is a shift in the 
traditional te/os of figure skating; a shift in the ultimate ends of the sporting practice 
that make the sport what it is. This would not be the first such shift in figure skating' s 
recent history. The compulsory figures, for which the sport was named, were removed 
from elite competitions after 1990. This change had unforeseen negative 
consequences which I examine later in this chapter. For now, it is important to 
recognize that alterations to a sport's te/os and their effects should not be taken lightly, 
and, as Brennan points out above, should not be made in haste as a knee-jerk reaction 
to scandal. The problems that figure skating faces today are not simple; they have 
grown in variety, complexity and degree over time. These will not be solved through 
a de-emphasis of the importance of artistry brought about by some quick-and-dirty 
change in the scoring system of the sport. On the contrary, such complex issues 
require serious discussions that, as a community of inquiry, the members of figure 
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skating' s elite practice community must carry out for the sake of their sport and its 
standing within the international sporting community. 
It is in this endeavor that the Maclntyrean account of sport may be helpful. As 
in the Casey Martin example, this approach would first require the members of the 
figure skating community to come to an agreement about what the telos of their sport 
is and what its shared internal goods are. In figure skating, this would mean working 
out the artistry/athleticism debate in public space. Through such a dialogue, 
community members must make decisions concerning the future of their sport. In 
doing this, members should examine figure skating' s present condition and its history 
in order to determine what elements make it a unique and meaningful sporting 
practice. As the debate is presented above, it appears to consist of two different 
visions of what figure skating should be. The first of these posits that its telos should 
be primarily athleticism and that its shared internal goods should consist of the variety 
of jumps, spins and moves that display a skater's prowess as an athlete. The second 
claims that the te/os of figure skating has been and should continue to be a blend of 
athleticism and artistry, and that its internal goods should include not only athletic 
movements, but also aesthetic ones that display a skater's grace and artistry. 
The general disagreement that separates these two sides leads naturally to their 
disagreement regarding figure skating' s scoring system. At the center of this second 
conflict is the presentation mark-the score representing the artistic impression of a 
skater's program. Currently, this score still carries more weight in the ranking of 
skaters than the score awarded for the technical merit of a skater's program. Those 
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arguing for the primacy of athleticism within figure skating contend that the 
presentation mark is too subjective a measure to be weighted so heavily. They 
contend that this mark should not be the factor determining where a skater is ranked in 
comparison with other skaters, because it is unclear exactly how it is or should be 
calculated. It is in the assessment of artistic impression that the cultural and personal 
biases of judges concerning such things as appearance, costumes, choreography and 
music creep into the scoring process. Since judges appear to have very different ideas 
about how or whether the above factors should be weighed in the calculation of the 
presentation mark, the validity of this mark appears questionable. To quote New York 
Times reporter Harvey Araton, "How do you quantify the scoring when there is so 
much focused on the execution of jumps, but where there is always room for a judge 
to say of a program, "Didn't quite do it for me"" (D 1 ). 
One possible solution for this problem of subjectivity would be to eliminate the 
presentation mark, thus, in theory, eliminating the effects of individual bias upon 
scoring. However, along with bias, the aesthetic elements that play an important role 
in defining figure skating as a sport would be at best de-emphasized and, at worst, 
rendered vacuous within the sport. To accept such a change would be to accept a new 
form of excellence within figure skating: One that emphasizes the importance of 
athletic moves that can be judged more objectively, but also ignores valued elements 
of the sport's traditional structure, like grace and beauty of movement and aesthetic 
expression. These elements are part of the practice of figure skating and have been a 
part of its history as a sport. Hence, the group dedicated to preserving the importance 
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of artistry_ within the sport would argue that we should not jettison the presentation 
mark without first discussing what role artistry will play in the re-created sport of 
figure skating. 
A brief look at figure skating's recent history also reveals a hidden relationship 
between a stronger emphasis on athleticism and the trend of young adolescents 
competing at the sport's elite level. In Edge of Glory_ Brennan explains this 
phenomenon in some detail. She notes that a dramatic change in the sport of women's 
figure skating occurred when the compulsory figures were dropped from elite 
competitions after 1990. These figures required hours of daily ice time to perfect, and, 
according to skater and commentator Scott Hamilton, essentially focused skaters on 
practicing skating as a craft. Once they were removed from competition, skaters, 
coaches began to focus their attention on jumps. Soon judges began to emphasize 
triple jumps over artistry in scoring programs, and younger, less developed 
adolescents suddenly gained an advantage within the sport. As judges rewarded the 
young ''jumping beans" for their athletic prowess, they neglected to deduct 
presentation points for the obvious lack of artistry they displayed. This placed older, 
more developed skaters not only at a disadvantage, but at risk of physical injury, as 
they practiced endlessly to add triple jumps to their programs in order to keep up with 
their new peers (131-33). 
As the importance of triple jumps has increased within figure skating, older 
skaters have also had to endure a struggle against the natural maturation process and 
their own weight in order to neutralize some of the advantage that their adolescent 
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colleagues have over them. Since, in journalist Joan Ryan's words, "[t]he less weight 
a skater has to haul into the air, the better her prospects of completing the jump," it 
stands to reason that younger, less physically developed skaters will have an initial 
advantage over more physically mature skaters ( 103 ). By having skaters keep their 
weight down, coaches know they can improve their athletes' chances of successfully 
completing their jumps and of winning in competition. This is why many skating 
coaches push their skaters to be as thin as possible. 
One coach who preaches the importance of low weight is Evy Scotvold, coach 
of former Olympian Nancy Kerrigan. Kerrigan won her silver medal at the 1994 
Olympic Games when she was 24 years old, an age by which many skaters have 
turned the sport over to younger competitors. Throughout her training, Scotvold 
impressed upon her that she would only be able to compete with younger skaters if she 
could successfully fend off the natural maturation processes of her body. Ryan notes 
that Scotvold and other coaches had the practice of regularly weighing in skaters and 
that he in particular "forgave neither puberty nor body type for skaters being anything 
but rail thin" (Ryan 96). In a telling quote, Scotvold states that 
[a]s soon as it's a woman's body, it's over [ . . .  ] When [skaters] have 
lovely figures like the girl on the street, they're probably too heavy [for 
figure skating] . The older you get trying to do children's athletics, the 
thinner you must be" (Ryan 96). 
Coaches also know that, by staying thin, athletes will garner favor from the 
majority of judges who prefer thinner skaters. As Scotvold sees it, the development of 
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a skater is more than simply the development of an athlete; it is also a "packaging 
process" in which the coach is "trying to create a princess of the ice" (Ryan 97). 
"[T]he perfect skater," Ryan observes, "is a combination of Twiggy and Barbie, thin 
enough to perform the difficult jumps and desirable enough to fit skating' s cover girl 
image" (97). This being so, it is easy to see why, as one anonymous former 
Olympian put it, "[it] you were skating better at a hundred and five pounds but looked 
better at a hundred, your coach wanted you at a hundred" (Ryan 98). 
Thin bodies may impress judges and make the execution of jumps easier, but 
the objectification and scrutinization female skaters endure in developing them can 
have damaging effects on their physical health and psychological well-being. Ryan 
reports that, although many coaches are concerned with their skaters making weight, 
they are not necessarily as concerned with the methods these athletes use to lose or 
maintain their weight. Unfortunately, this has led many female skaters to employ 
unhealthy weight loss techniques and develop eating disorders such as bulimia (Ryan 
98- 101  ). She cites former United States ice dancer Susie Wynne as an example of 
how an athlete can come to risk her well-being for her career. Wynne's coach was 
obsessive about weight and weighed athletes daily. Wynne began to throw up after 
each meal to help keep her weight down in order to please him. Even using this tactic, 
she still struggled. One day, her coach told her she would have to lose ten pounds by 
the end of the week or he would not take her to the US Nationals. She continued 
vomiting, took laxatives, and even stopped eating all together in order to make weight. 
Her coach never asked how she accomplished the feat. Wynne eventually sought and 
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received help for her problem, but her story and the stories of other skaters formulate 
an undercurrent to figure skating' s narrative that coaches, judges and officials within 
the sport can ill-afford to ignore (Ryan 98-99). 
Mature skaters like Wynne, however, are not the only ones at risk in the sport. 
Young adolescent girls are being placed under the tremendous physical and 
psychological pressures that are part of competing at the elite level, all because their 
lighter, immature bodies allow them to execute demanding jumps more comfortably 
than their older opponents. This questionable practice has drawn some attention from 
coaches, but not enough to stop these young girls from being placed in the spotlight 
(Brennan, Edge of Glory 133). Today, adolescent skaters are a force within women's 
figure skating, and questions continue to arise concerning whether or not competing at 
the elite level is in their best interests. Are the pressures they face psychologically 
harmful to their development as persons? Are their bodies well enough developed to 
handle the physical demands of regularly practicing a variety of triple jumps? Such 
questions are ones to which the figure skating community has yet to offer answers, and 
ones it will need to answer if it is to justify the view of excellence that is currently 
accepted within the sport. 
Our trip back through the last twelve years of women's figure skating history 
has revealed that an increased emphasis on athleticism within the sport has had 
unanticipated negative effects upon its participants. We have seen that some mature 
female skaters have had to pay a high price for the brand of excellence that has 
become the te/os of the sport. The increased emphasis on athleticism has privileged 
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younger skaters over more mature ones and has placed further emphasis on 
appearance and body weight, pushing some skaters, who could have competed well 
when a blend of artistry and athleticism was stressed, to take up dangerous weight loss 
habits in order to continue to compete at the elite level. 
Some might argue that the plight of these mature skaters is simply a result of 
figure skating' s progressive evolution as a sport, and, therefore, should not concern the 
members of the elite practice community. A similar but opposite brand of evolution 
continues to operate in professional football, where men who once played on the 
offensive line at a weight of about 250 pounds could not even compete for positions 
with the full compliment of 300-pound linemen that play the sport today. The 
question is are these 300-pounders using steroids, human growth hormone or other 
dangerous banned drugs or supplements to achieve higher weight and greater strength? 
Moreover, are some athletes having to take these illegal and potentially harmful 
performance enhancers to continue competing in the sport? If the answers to these 
questions is yes, it would appear that the NFL community has implicitly chosen to 
accept a form of athletic excellence that requires linemen to risk their health beyond 
the inherent risks of the sport. Is this an ethically sound form of excellence? Should 
the achievement of excellence in football at the elite level require athletes to put 
themselves further at risk in order to achieve gigantism? 
Similarly, should mature figure skaters have to place themselves at risk of 
developing eating disorders to achieve excellence at the elite level? It is one thing to 
accept that certain athletes will be better suited to perform particular skills or play 
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particular positions or sports because of their height, weight and body type. It is quite 
another to take this to the extent that athletes who are already large in the case of 
football or already thin in the case of figure skating must take these features to 
extremes in order to compete at the elite level. It is important for the members of 
sport practice communities to examine issues of this kind to insure that athletes are 
protected from unnecessary risk to their physical and mental well-being. Thus, it is 
important for the figure skating community come together to discuss how to make its 
sport safer for mature and adolescent competitors alike. And, since it appears that the 
increased emphasis on athleticism is partially responsible for placing athletes at risk, 
the community might well conclude that it would be beneficial to return to a telos in 
which artistry and athleticism play a more balanced role within the sport. 
Those who contend that athleticism should be emphasized over artistry within 
the sport would at this point argue that to accept a more balanced telos is to accept the 
political problems and subjectivity that have traditionally plagued the fairness of 
figure skating competitions. They would argue that as long as aesthetics play a role in 
how skaters are judged, there will be room for international judging politics and 
cultural and personal biases to influence the outcomes of competitions. These 
concerns are ones that must be taken seriously, for, as we will see, they have corrupted 
the practice of figure skating for some time. However, as we will also see, bias and 
politics are problems that may be dealt with using a Maclntyrean approach that 
accounts for these corruptive forces as threats to fairness, honesty, safety and aesthetic 
freedom. In accepting a balance between athleticism and artistry, community 
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members need not accept judging politics and overt bias as part of figure skating. On 
the contrary, by reasoning from a balanced telos they may eliminate or at least 
minimize the effects of such corruptive actions on their practice, thus improving the 
sport's moral integrity and maintaining that which makes it a historically unique 
competitive activity. Before demonstrating how the members of figure skating' s elite 
community could go about accomplishing this task, however, it is necessary to briefly 
explain how politics and bias have affected the sport over the years. 
International politics and the politics of judging are believed to have affected 
the outcomes of many elite competitions, including the pairs competition of the 2002 
Winter Olympics and the women's competition of the 1980 Olympic Games. The 
most notable misuses of power have occurred when judges have abused their power by 
favoring skaters from their own countries, downgrading skaters from specific 
countries or taking part in judging blocs influenced by international politics or by 
politics within the sport itself. In examining the scoring from the men's, women's and 
pairs figure skating competitions of the 1968- 1988 Olympic Games, Seltzer and Glass 
found that judges scored skaters from their own nation significantly higher than 
skaters from other nations (1 89). More recently, Dodd and Michaelis reported from 
the 2002 Winter Games that the judges they had spoken with admitted to being 
"favorably disposed" toward skaters from their own country. Some even said they felt 
"obliged to lobby for them," but all noted that their biases were limited by the 
sanctions (i.e. , probations and suspensions) they could face if they favored their 
skaters unjustly (2D). Seltzer and Glass also found that some judges tended to 
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penalize skaters from certain nations. Soviet judges, for example, tended to 
downgrade American skaters, while American judges tended to favor their own 
skaters to a greater degree than did Soviet judges ( 196-97). Finally, they also verified 
that judges during the period from 1968 to 1988 tended to vote in political blocs 
arranged according to Cold War political alliances. For instance, Eastern block judges 
tended to favor Czechoslovakian, Hungarian and Polish skaters and to penalize 
Western skaters in general and American skaters in particular ( 196-97). As 
mentioned previously, bloc judging seemed to make a comeback at the 2002 Winter 
Olympics. This, however, has yet to be confirmed through research. 
The politics of reputation can also affect the objectivity and fairness of judging 
in figure skating. At the international level, judges are required to watch each skater's 
pre-competition practice sessions to acquaint themselves with his or her program and 
technique. Many judges and officials contend that this practice is necessary because it 
allows judges to develop "preconceived notions of skaters' abilities" that will help 
them avoid scoring early skaters too high and leaving no room for superior 
performances from later participants (Dodd & Michaelis 2D). However, the 
expectations judges gain from practices and from past competitions can also lead them 
to pre-rank skaters before their performances, thus unfairly influencing the outcome of 
the current competition. In regard to this practice, Ryan notes that "[t]he flaw in the 
system is clear: the playing field isn't level on the day of competition. Judges leave 
little room for upstarts to have the performances of their lives, and prop up recognized 
stars who have an off night" ( 180-81 ). 
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Examples of how the pre-ranking of skaters affects the outcomes of 
competitions abound. At the 1994 U. S. pairs championships, favorites Karen 
Courtland and Todd Reynolds skated well in practice, but Courtland fell three times 
and tripped Reynolds once during the competition. Challengers Natasha Kuchiki and 
Rocky Marvel skated a clean and beautiful program, but the judges mysteriously 
ranked Courtland and Reynolds ahead of them. This awkward decision deprived 
Kuchiki and Marvel of the spot on the 1994 U. S. Olympic team that they appeared to 
have earned, and allowed Courtland and Reynolds to get by with a sub-par 
performance (Ryan 1 8 1  ). 
In the men's competition at the 1992 Olympic Games in Albertville, France, 
American Paul Wylie appeared to outskate Russia's Victor Petrenko, but Petrenko 
received the gold medal. Many believed the judges favored Petrenko over Wylie due 
to his own consistency and Wylie's inconsistency in previous meets ( 1 82). Scotvold, 
Wylie's coach, contended that it was "unfair" of the judges to pre-judge his skater in 
this manner, but that this decision and others had to be accepted as simply part of the 
sport. "We all know how it works," he said, 
So judges have to have an idea of what a person is like before they 
judge them . . .  It might sound imperfect, but it's as humanly good as 
we've been able to come up with, and all of us who have been around 
know so . . . So there is fairness to it in that everybody knows this is 
how it works. The only thing that would be unfair is if they suddenly 
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decided they're going to do it differently and they didn't tell me (Ryan 
1 83). 
While Scotvold and others seem resigned to accepting judging on reputation as 
a fair practice, many other members of the figure skating community are not willing to 
accept pre-ranking as part of the judging process. These individuals are seeking 
reforms that will bring fairness and honesty back to their sport. Using a Maclntyrean 
approach, those who challenge the status quo may bring forth their reforms in the 
name of these virtues, which will play a key role in the practical reasoning of any 
sporting community. Without fairness and honesty, the practice of figure skating or 
any other sporting practice would lose its credibility as a sport; for, if an elite sport 
cannot reliably deliver a fair decision, it is not so much a sport as it is entertainment. 
In the case of figure skating, it is only by a return to fairness and honesty in judging 
that the members of the community will be able to reestablish figure skating' s 
integrity as a sporting practice. Hence, contrary to what those in favor of a telos of 
athleticism might think, a community can move to stop political shenanigans like bloc 
judging, vote trading, or the ranking of skaters according to their reputations or the 
strength of their pre-competition practice sessions by reasoning practically from a 
telos that is based on a balance of artistry and athleticism. 
Can a balanced telos also help community members to work out which artistic 
elements skaters should be graded on? As we have seen, elements such as skaters' 
appearances and the costumes, music and choreography they choose for their 
programs are susceptible to the cultural and personal biases of judges and tend to 
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invite arbitrary judgments. Can the Maclntyrean approach be used in this case to 
reduce the effects of bias while also helping to integrate elements that may be fairly 
included in the judgment of skaters into the sport? 
To begin, we must recognize that since elite international competitions are 
judged by individuals from a variety of cultural and personal backgrounds, it is 
impossible to eliminate all such bias from their judging of skating programs. Efforts 
have been made to reduce the effects of variables susceptible to subjective bias on the 
scoring and ranking of skaters. Longman reports, for example, that elite international 
judges are attending "presentation schools'' with programs designed to reduce the 
effects that a performer's aesthetic choices have upon their scores. He notes that 
cultural bias does exist with regard to music and choreography and does affect the 
marks skaters receive from particular judges. Eastern European judges, for instance, 
often grade programs using classical music and choreography higher than those with a 
modem theme, while Western judges are more open to modem programs (Longman 
C19). 
Even though subjectivity cannot be eliminated from the judging of figure 
skating contests, it remains a legitimate question as to whether it is fair that the music 
to which an athlete wishes to express herself or the choreography that she believes 
best displays her artistry and athleticism should be factored into her presentation mark. 
Difficult questions also arise on the opposite side of this issue. Is it really possible to 
separate the moves of a skater from the music to which she is moving? From the 
choreography that scripts her movements? Or from the costume in which she is 
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moving? Are these elements not part of a skater's performance as well as the jumps 
and spins and stylistic moves? Furthermore, even if it is possible to separate the grace 
and beauty of a skater' s  movements from the aesthetic choices she has made, is it 
really possible to quantify the artistic impression she has made during a given 
performance? Finally, if costume, music and choreography can be factored into the 
presentation mark, have we opened the door for appearance to be factored into that 
mark as well? 
While some aesthetic elements may be successfully integrated into figure 
skating, a skater's appearance cannot and should not be graded by judges. If 
appearance is weighted into skaters' scores, athletes could be influenced to take up 
unhealthy eating practices in order to achieve the thinness that would sway judges to 
award them higher scores and rankings. Moreover, in relation to the fairness issue, 
why should skaters, as athletes, be rewarded or downgraded by judges because they do 
not fit the model of femininity that judges accept? In answering this question, perhaps 
the members of figure skating' s elite community should ask themselves what they 
would do in the following scenario. What if there was an excellent female skater who 
was facially disfigured in a way that limited her range of expressions and made her 
difficult to look at. Should her scores be downgraded because she cannot smile or 
display the emotions for which her music seems to call? Should she be ranked below 
another skater because her face is distracting or ugly to the judges, even though she 
performs equally as well as her opponent? Since such scoring decisions would clearly 
148 
be unfair, appearance should not be included as a factor in the judging of figure 
skating contests. 
The above questions relating to the inclusion of subjective elements in judging 
are important ones that, according to the Maclntyrean account of sport, must be 
examined by the members of the figure skating community if they are to agree upon 
ways of legitimately integrating these factors into the scoring of the sport while 
minimizing the effects of factors that threaten the fairness of competitions and the 
artistic freedom and safety of the athletes. By utilizing a Maclntyrean approach and 
reasoning from a te/os that emphasizes a balance between elements of athleticism and 
artistry, community members could offer strong answers to these questions that would 
help improve the moral standing of the sport. They would be able to reason that 
appearance should have minimal to no effect on scoring, because it is unfair to judge 
athletes upon criteria that have nothing to do with their athletic or artistic 
performances. Furthermore, if appearance is weighed into the scoring and ranking of 
skaters, some skaters may feel pressured to adopt unsafe eating habits in order to 
continue to compete or to win at the elite level. Judges should not favor thin skaters 
beyond the initial advantage they have in completing their jumps. In this manner, the 
fairness of skating competitions will increase and a wider variety of skaters will be 
able to compete more safely without the fear of having to "sell" their bodies to judges. 
In relation to the costumes that skaters wear and the music and choreography 
of their programs, the figure skating community must discuss if and how these 
aesthetic elements should be factored into scoring. Each of these elements is not only 
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subject to cultural and personal bias, they are chosen by individual skaters and their 
coaches to compliment that skater's athletic skills and artistic movements. They are 
thus of only secondary importance in relation to these skills and movements-the 
shared internal goods of figure skating-and should be graded as such. Using this 
logic, judges should not be able to integrate these secondary elements into the scoring 
of skaters in such a way that they outweigh a skater's performance of jumps, spins and 
aesthetic movements. By limiting or minimizing the effects that costumes, music, and 
choreography have on the scoring and ranking of skaters, the figure skating 
community would take yet another step toward reestablishing fairness within its sport. 
It would also maximize the artistic freedom of skaters, who would be able to make the 
aesthetic choices they believe are best for themselves without fearing that judges' 
preferences would negatively affect their scores. 
In summary, the Maclntyrean account of sport can help community members 
to ensure the fairness of figure skating while also maintaining the sport as a unique 
type of sporting competition in which both athleticism and artistry play a defining 
role. By reasoning from a telos in which these elements are blended together and from 
its related internal goods, the community of elite figure skating should, in the name of 
fairness and honesty, eliminate international political games, including the practices of 
vote trading and bloc judging that have plagued their sport for years, and should 
minimize the effects that skaters' reputations and practice routines have on their scores 
and rankings. Members should also, in the interest of fairness, aesthetic freedom and 
safety, minimize the influence that appearance has uponjudges' scoring. Finally, 
1 50 
members could further ensure aesthetic freedom within skating competitions by 
limiting the emphasis that judges may place on costumes, music, choreography and 
other complimentary but secondary elements in their calculations. 
The above demonstration reveals how the Maclntyrean account of sport might 
assist the members of figure skating' s elite community in improving their sport' s 
moral condition and its standing within the international sporting community. But are 
there other theories of sport we have examined that could lead us to an equally strong 
solution? Neither formalism nor conventionalism is a strong candidate to do so, since 
each of these theories is biased in favor of the current rules and conventions of sports 
respectively. Formalists would contend that the current rules of figure skating, 
including the current scoring system that many believe should be replaced, define the 
sport and, thus, should not be altered. They would contend that if judges observed the 
rules of the sport, no rule changes would be necessary and competitions would be 
fairly contested. Formalism would thus fail to grant the members of the figure skating 
community the public space to discuss the telos of the sport. Finally, it would give the 
members of the figure skating community no guidance as to which rule changes could 
be made for the good of their sport and which would not be in the sport's best 
interests. The formalist account of sport would, therefore, be of little help to the elite 
figure skating community in this case, because it does not give its members the 
normative tools to improve their sport either morally or as a unique sporting practice. 
Conventionalism would be in an equally weak position when compared with 
the Maclntyrean account of sport in this instance. A conventionalist would claim that 
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subjectivity in the fonn of cultural and personal preference has become "part of the 
sport" of figure skating, and would view such preferences as the inevitable 
consequences of human judging. The manner in which judges are influenced by 
choreography and music is simply a by-product of this, and, hence, should be accepted 
as a traditional part of figure skating. Thus we see that conventionalism, like 
fonnalism, would fail to assist the members of figure skating' s elite community in 
answering questions concerning the telos of their sport or the adequacy of the current 
scoring system. Insofar as it accepts judging preferences or biases as "part of the 
sport," conventionalism would also fail to question whether these secondary elements 
of figure skating are influencing judges to a greater extent than they should and, thus, 
threatening the fairness of competitions. It would also open the door for other 
subjective factors, such as appearance, to remain a factor in the judging of the sport. 
Since conventionalism could not assist the members of the figure skating community 
with the primary problems facing them, it, like fonnalism, would fail to help them to 
nonnatively improve the sport. 
The theory that could assist community members to some extent in this 
instance would be Roberts' version of anti-fonnalism. This account stresses the 
importance of creativity and individuality within sport and, thus, would endorse a 
balance of athleticism and artistry that would permit skaters to use a variety of athletic 
and aesthetic moves in their efforts to recreate themselves. Robertsian anti-formalists 
would also be in favor of minimizing cultural and personal biases that could inhibit 
aesthetic license, so that skaters would be free to use the music, choreography and 
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costumes they believe best allowed them to express themselves as athletes and artists. 
Roberts' view would also stand against judging skaters upon their appearance, since 
this too would place a limitation upon their freedom as aesthetic athletes. Lastly, his 
theory would prohibit political games in judging contests and the practice of scoring 
and ranking skaters by reputation, since such actions would also limit the 
achievements of skaters in an unfair and unreasonable manner. 
While Roberts' anti-formalist account might lead the figure skating community 
to the same answers regarding its sport as the Maclntyrean account, its emphasis on 
freedom, creativity and individuality would ultimately be its undoing. As you will 
recall, Roberts' view does not give sporting communities a space within which to 
publicly discuss the telos or shared common goods of the sport (Morgan, Private or 
Public 26-27). Hence, although it would endorse a balanced telos at times, it would 
also support skaters' rights to emphasize athleticism over artistry in their programs or 
vice versa should they be inclined to do so. In the absence of public discussion 
concerning the ultimate ends and internal goods of figure skating, skaters would be 
allowed to "compete" as they pleased, since, on Roberts' view, it would not be proper 
to limit them in any manner. This inevitably would place judges in a difficult position, 
forcing them to score and rank programs too dissimilar for comparison. Indeed, when 
placed in such a spot, judges might well revert back to cultural and personal 
preference as a way of determining where skaters should be ranked in relation to one 
another. Thus it appears that if the figure skating community followed Roberts' 
account of sport, the fonnal framework of the sport would become quite ambiguous 
because of the stronger emphasis placed upon individual freedom and creative 
expression. As that formal structure became more unstable, figure skating' s moral 
standing and its standing as a sport would become even more tenuous, since there 
would be no space in which to distinguish individual actions that were good for the 
sport from those that were not in its best interests. 
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The Maclntyrean theory, on the other hand, does give the members of the 
figure skating community a space in which to decide the best way to conduct their 
practice according to its telos. A formal framework of rules and a suitable scoring 
system that helps judges to accurately measure the performances of skaters could be 
rationally developed from this te/os; ones that are true to both the artistic and athletic 
internal goods of the sport. The Maclntyrean view also would stress the importance of 
the virtues of fairness and compassion within the decision-making process of the sport, 
both of which could play an important role in the moral improvement and functioning 
of the sport and its community. By acting on these virtues, members of figure 
skating' s elite community would be able to make decisions to increase the fairness and 
safety of competitions. Skaters would be able to skate more freely, knowing that their 
aesthetic choices, appearances and past or practice performances would only 
minimally affect their scores and ranks and that they were being judged on the merits 
of their performances that day. Therefore, I conclude that the Maclntyrean account of 
sport is normatively stronger than Roberts' version of anti-formalism in this case. It 
gives the members of the figure skating community a public forum in which to discuss 
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and debate their sport, and provides them with the guidance necessary to make the 
decisions that would be in the best interests of figure skating. 
Concluding Remarks 
The case of figure skating and the Casey Martin case have helped to 
demonstrate the normative value of the Maclntyrean theory of sport. This account 
provides the members of practice communities with space in which to clarify what the 
ultimate ends (teloi) and shared internal goods of their sport are, and to decide which 
virtues best facilitate the attainment of these goods. The theory also guides them to 
reason from these elements to the actions that would be in the best interests of their 
sport and, thus, helps them to make decisions that would improve the moral integrity 
of the sport. As a result, they would make only those changes to its rules and 
challenges that would maintain its uniqueness and meaningfulness as a particular form 
of athletic competition. Finally, the Maclntyrean account of sport requires that the 
members of a sporting community be willing to reexamine their telos, internal goods, 
virtues, actions and reasoning in the face of challenges from dissenters or upon their 
own recognition of specific problems so that they are able to upgrade their practical 
reasoning and keep their practice safe from corruption. 
The Maclntyrean view of sport thus gives the members of sporting 
communities the normative space and guidance necessary to determine what is best for 
their sport. As we have seen, elite sports are not often critical terrain for their 
community members. This is one important reason why individual and institutional 
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concerns are allowed to have their way within their confines. Without reflection and 
criticism, there is a tendency for those who govern and participate in sport to utilize 
instrumental and egoistic thinking to justify the acquisition of external goods over the 
pursuit of the internal goods and virtues of the sport. 
When the Maclntyrean approach to practical reasoning becomes the way of 
thinking in sporting practices, instrumental concerns diminish in importance and 
power and wealth are used in the service of the practice, helping it to flourish rather 
than eroding its moral standing and the meaning it has for those that love it. When 
sports are treated primarily as culturally valuable practices rather than profit-bearing 
businesses, community members come to recognize the responsibilities that they have 
as caretakers of their sports. As such, members must understand their sports as 
practices; they must understand the skills, strategies, challenges, standards and 
traditions that make their sports the particular activities they are. They must also work 
to cultivate the virtues that will guide them to act rationally within the sport so that 
their actions will meet the best standards of practical reasoning within the sport. 
If community members carry out these responsibilities and remain openminded 
and inquiring toward ideas and criticisms that could improve their practices, they 
would meet their obligations as vigilant caretakers of their sport. In doing so, these 
membes would not only be recognizing "the good of the game," but, as members of 
Maclntyrean reflective communities, they would be reasoning from that good and 
manifesting it within their sports. Furthermore, they would have formed strong 
communities of inquiry capable of defending their sports from corruptive forces that 
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might attack their moral integrity and cultural meaning. It is this type of community 
that is needed in elite sports today if the tide of instrumental reasoning and self­
interested action is to be stemmed. For it is only through the efforts of such 
communities that sports will be able to stand up as the morally and c�turally 
meaningful practices that many believe them to be inpotentia. 
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